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                                                Summary 
 
A Comparison of the Labour Dispute Resolution Systems of South Africa and 
Swaziland 
                                                   by 
 
                                   Maseko Moses Majinda 
 
History and Background 
The history of statutory labour dispute resolution of South Africa dates back to 1909, 
when the Transvaal Disputes Prevention Act of 1909 was promulgated which applied 
only to the Transvaal.   
 
The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924  established industrial councils and ad hoc 
conciliation boards and  excluded black workers from the statutory definition of 
employee and this resulted in a dual industrial relations system that existed up to 
1979.  
 
The history of statutory labour dispute resolution of Swaziland dates back to 1980 
when the first Industrial Relations Act of 1980 was promulgated which established the 
first Industrial Court. 
 
The Present Statutory Systems 
 
South Africa and Swaziland use conciliation as the primary dispute resolution 
mechanism and any dispute that remains unresolved after conciliation is referred to 
arbitration or court adjudication or the parties may engage in strike or lockout action 
if the dispute is a dispute of interest in non-essential services. In both jurisdictions, the 
high Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour/Industrial Court where 
legislation does not give the Labour/Industrial Court exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
In South Africa, constitutional matters are dealt with by the Constitutional court while 
in Swaziland they are handled by the High Court. 
 
 viii
In South Africa and Swaziland, defective arbitration awards are reviewed by the 
Labour Court and the High Court respectively.  
 
The present non-statutory systems 
 
Both in South Africa and in Swaziland Collective agreements for registered trade 
unions and employer organizations are expected to contain private dispute resolution 
procedures that will replace the corresponding procedures in the Labour/ Industrial 
Relations Act(s). 
 
Disputes involving Diplomats accredited to Swaziland are handled by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade as per the observation of the Protocol Treaty. Any party to 
a labour dispute in Swaziland has a customary right to report that dispute directly to 
the King as the Head of State.  
 
Research Findings 
 
The dispute resolution systems of South Africa and Swaziland contain both 
similarities and differences.  
 
Lessons for Swaziland include combining general and specific dispute resolution 
procedures, providing the right of a referring party to apply for condonation for late 
referral of a dispute, using conciliation-arbitration, making arbitration proceedings 
public hearings, influence of parties on the appointment of arbitrators, court 
adjudication, pre-dismissal arbitration, court adjudication by judges only, 
establishment of a constitutional court, full protection of protected strikes/ lockouts 
from interdicts, legalization of sympathy strikes, and removal of strikes/ lockout 
ballot. 
 
Lessons for South Africa include plural representation of parties at conciliation and 
arbitration, re-direction of some disputes by the Labour Court to the Commission for 
arbitration, reporting of labour disputes direct to the Head of State for determination.  
 
 
 ix
Table of Legislation 
     
South Africa 
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
Industrial Conciliation Act no 11 of 1924 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
Master and Servants Act of 1841 
Transvaal Disputes Prevention Act 20 of 1909   
 
Swaziland 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act 73 of 2005 
Employment Act 5 of 1980 
Industrial Relations Act of 2005 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 569 of 2000 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 143 of 1996 
Industrial Relations Act 4 of 1980 
Workmen’s Compensation Act 7 of 1983 
 
 
Table of cases 
 
South Africa 
Afrox Ltd v SACWU and others (2) (1997) 18 ILJ 406 (LC) 
Bargaining Council for the Clothing Industry (Natal) v Confederation of Employers of 
Southern Africa and others (1998) 19 ILJ 1458 (LC) 
Carephone Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 11 ILJ 406 (LC) 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Munucipality v Campanella NO and others (2004) 1 
BllR 1 (LAC)  
County Fair Foods Ltd v FAWU 2001 5 BLLR 494 (LAC) 
Dartprops Ltd v CCMA 1992 2 BLLR 494 (LAC) 
Eskom Ltd v Hiemstra NO 1999 10 BLLR 1041 (LC) 
Eskom  Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 2001 22 ILJ 618 (WLD)  
 x
Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 22 ILJ 2407 (SCA) 
Hofmeyr v Network Health Care Holdings Ltd (2004) 3 BLLR 232 (LC) 
Louw v Acting Chairman of the Board of directors of the North West Housing 
Corporation and another (2000) 21 ILJ 482(B) 
MITUSA Transnet Ltd (20002) 10 BLLR 1023 
Modise and others v Steve’s Spar Blackhealth (2000) 21 ILJ (LAC) 
NEHAWU v University of Cape Town and others (2003) 24 ILJ (CC) 
NUMSA v Baderbob (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC) 
Parnet v Finnemore 1999 2 BLLR 151 (LC) 
SACCAWU v Speciality Stores (1998) 4 BLLR 352 (LAC) 
Shoprite Checkers Ltd v Ramdaw NO 2000 1 BLLR 20 (LAC) 
Tony Gois t/a Shakespeare,s Pub v Van Zyl 2003 11 BLLR 1176 (LC) 
 
Swaziland 
Crooks Plantations and Swaziland Agricultural Plantations Workers Union (1984) 
(HC) unreported 
Swaziland Agricultural and Plantations Workers Union v Royal Swaziland Sugar 
Corporation (2005) unreported 
 
Declaration 
I, Maseko Moses Majinda, do hereby declare, in writing, that this treatise that I am 
submitting to the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University for examination purposes 
is my own work and it has not previously been submitted for assessment to another 
university or for another qualification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Labour disputes demand a means of prevention1 and in the last resort demand a means 
of resolution, which differs from case to case, as the labour dispute prevention 
mechanisms cannot prevent all disputes. Hence, Labour dispute resolution is an 
inherent2 part of employment relationships.3  Most labour disputes arise from 
disagreements in collective bargaining which are caused by the inherent conflict of 
interest between labour and capital. The outcome of collective bargaining is either an 
agreement (consensus) or a disagreement. In the case of disagreement, additional 
dispute resolution processes must be followed with a view to settle the dispute.  
 
In the case of compulsory processes, the choice of a process may be dictated by the 
party who declares a dispute and who can compel the other party to abide by its 
choice.4
 
Labour disputes should be resolved as expeditiously, efficiently, informally, non-
technically and cheaply as possible. However, it should be noted that not all labour 
disputes end in resolution of the dispute. Often one or more parties simply decide to 
withdraw from the dispute because it lacks interest in pursuing the dispute or because 
it has concluded that it does not have the power to resolve the dispute to its 
satisfaction. 
 
In consensus-seeking dispute resolution procedures such as negotiation, conciliation, 
mediation, non-binding fact-finding and advisory arbitration it is the parties 
themselves who resolve the dispute by making compromises and eventually reaching 
an agreement through the assistance of an independent third party. However, a danger 
                                                 
1 Dispute prevention entails identifying dispute-causing factors in all the employment sections, with the 
view of providing interventions and initiatives to remedy the causes. 
2 Inherent means inescapable and inevitable. 
3 Blanpain Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2005)  89. 
4 Brand, Lotter, Mishcke and Steadman Labour Dispute Resolution (2005) 64. 
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of consensuality and a neutral role for the third party is that the outcome of the dispute 
resolution process simply reflects the power imbalance between the parties 
themselves. Where power is evenly balanced the outcome may be equitable. 
 
For the sake of maintaining their mutual employment relationship and the 
organisation’s continued operations, the parties to a dispute are eager to resolve their 
disputes themselves, despite the existence of inherent conflict of interest between 
them.  
 
Figure 1: Famous Cartoon by Johnson and Johnson5
 
Conflict 
Conflict 
Conflict 
Conflict 
Accommodation 
Co-operation 
Agreement 
In non-consensus-seeking dispute resolution procedures involving independent third 
party intervention such as in final and binding arbitration and court adjudication, the 
dispute is resolved by the independent third party who makes and imposes on the 
parties to the dispute a final and binding decision. In non-consensus-seeking dispute 
resolution procedures not involving third party intervention such as strikes, lockouts 
                                                 
5 Pottas and Nieumeijer Onderhandeling – ‘n Fyn Kuns (1992) 44 
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and protest action, the dispute is resolved by one of the parties to the dispute through 
the exercise of power.  
 
1.1 Classification of Labour Disputes 
 
Labour disputes are conventionally divided into two broad categories, namely, 
disputes of right6 and disputes of interest7 because different methods are used for their 
resolution. The nature of these two different types of dispute is also generally of a 
different nature. The dispute resolution systems of South Africa and Swaziland work 
explicitly with the distinction between disputes of right and disputes of interest. To 
determine whether a dispute is a dispute of right or of interest, the substance of the 
dispute rather than its form must be considered. The way the parties characterise the 
dispute is not important, but what is important is the real substance of the dispute 
rather than its legal form.  
 
 Disputes of right are appropriately settled by interpreting or applying the existing 
rights where application had been withheld. They are appropriately settled by rights-
based negotiation, conciliation and in the final resort, by arbitration or adjudication, 
which involves independent third party intervention. Although conciliation is better 
suited to the resolution of disputes of interest, it is nonetheless used before arbitration 
and adjudication in order to facilitate the settlement of a dispute of right.  
 
 It is the disputes of right that daily come before courts and arbitrators for 
determination. It is often easier to see who is right or wrong in a dispute of right: the 
arbitrator or court can refer to the statute, the collective agreement, the individual 
contract of employment or the common law of employment. There is, in principle at 
least, a right answer to the issue in dispute. It is also possible for a dispute of right to 
                                                 
6A dispute of right or a grievance or a legal dispute is a  dispute about whether one party has the right 
he claims to have as embodied in labour legislation, a collective agreement, an individual contract of 
employment or common law of employment. Some rights are formalised in socially accepted standards 
of behaviour such as reciprocity, precedent, equality and seniority. Hence, a dispute of right involves 
the interpretation or application of existing rights created by statute, individual contract of employment 
or collective bargaining agreement as to whether a party has right to do, to receive, to give or to refrain 
from doing something. 
7 A dispute of interest is a dispute in which a party seeks to create a new right to which he is not yet 
entitled but to which he would like to be entitled through negotiation and it arises out of deadlocks in 
collective bargaining. Such a dispute is inherent in collective bargaining and is a major cause of most 
industrial action in employment settings. Interests are needs, desires, wants, concerns and fears. 
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be resolved by a strike or lockout. If, for example, an employer is forced by a strike to 
reinstate an employee dismissed for theft, there is a resolution of some sort to the 
dispute, though not, of course, to the question of the employee’s guilt. Sometimes 
rights are rarely clear especially where there are different and sometimes 
contradictory standards that apply. Adjudication and arbitration are prototypically 
rights procedure in which disputants present their evidence and arguments to a neutral 
third party who has the power to hand don a final and binding decision. Negotiations 
in the context of resolving disputes of right are primarily rights-based and secondarily 
power-based. Power-based negotiations are marked by threats. Only adjudication can 
authoritatively resolve questions of rights.  
 
Disputes of interest are traditionally and appropriately resolved by interest-based 
negotiation, conciliation or mediation and in the final resort, by a strike or a lockout. 
Arbitration , adjudication and government action are not normally considered 
appropriate for the resolution of disputes of interest because the issues involved are 
generally too wide-ranging and it is difficult to say who is right or wrong because 
each particular case depends on whose interest at heart is the cause of the dispute. 
Arbitration and adjudication of interest disputes may be used if the parties to the 
dispute agree to that. There is provision in the Labour Relations Act8 of South Africa 
and the Industrial Relations Act9 of Swaziland for the compulsory arbitration of 
interest disputes in essential services as an obligatory substitute for a strike or lockout 
in order to avoid endangering the life, health or safety of the whole or part of the 
population. 10 However, these Acts provide no guidelines for interest arbitration. 
 
Arbitration can also be used to settle interest disputes in non-essential services, when 
there is failure of settlement by conciliation, mediation, strike, lockout or other 
available procedure. For example, in 1996, an arbitrator was obtained from South 
Africa to arbitrate an interest dispute between the Swaziland Association of Teachers 
and the Swaziland Government over an 18 % pay rise after a two-month long strike 
had failed to resolve the dispute. The arbitrator ruled in favour of the government. 
 
                                                 
8  66 of 1995. 
9  Of 2005. 
10 s 74 (4) of the LRA, 66 of 1995; ss 94 (2) and 96 (b) of the IRA of 2005. 
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However, a right becomes an interest on the lapse of the agreement or on the 
invalidation of the law in which it is incorporated. This means that re-negotiation or 
re-enactment is necessary in order to revive the right or change the interest back into a 
right. Once an agreement has been reached, the interest sought once the new terms are 
written into a contract of employment, statute or collective agreement becomes a 
right. 
 
Resolving disputes of interest is not easy. It involves probing for deep-seated 
concerns, devising creative solutions and making trade-offs and concessions where 
interests are opposed. This is done by employing the following procedures: 
negotiation, conciliation, mediation, non-binding fact finding and advisory arbitration. 
Negotiations in this context are primarily interest-based and secondarily rights-based 
and power-based.11
 
The distinction between disputes of right and disputes of interest is not always 
absolute but is a matter of controversy when it comes to the classification of some 
disputes which have characteristics of both types. A claim for equal pay for work of 
equal value, for instance, may straddle the conceptual divide. The mere fact that a 
dispute happens to have a rights dimension does not mean that it cannot also form the 
subject of a protected strike or lockout. Where there is a provision that entitles a party 
to refer an interest dispute to arbitration, that party can choose between arbitration and 
strike or lockout.12  
 
The line that divides disputes of right from disputes of interest is a semi-permeable 
membrane or wall, through which disputes that are normally of one type pass and are 
handled under procedures usually reserved for disputes of the other type. Thus, in 
certain contexts or countries disputes of interest are disposed of through arbitration 
and adjudication procedures supposedly reserved for disputes of right, and disputes of 
right are disposed of by conciliation and mediation, which in some countries are 
primarily employed in disputes of interest. It is for this reason that labour courts in 
many countries often settle disputes instead of adjudicating them by applying non-
                                                 
11 Ury, Brett and Goldberg Getting Disputes Resolved (2005) 6. 
12 MITUSA v Transnet Ltd 2002 10 BLLR 1023. 
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legal principles. It is also for the very same reason that negotiations generally involve 
a mix of interests-based, rights-based and power-based negotiations. 
 
When resolving a dispute the focus may shift from interests to rights to power and 
back again. The resolution of disputes of interest takes place within the context of the 
parties’ rights and power.13 For example, parties may not reach agreement on the 
basis of interests because their perceptions of who is right or who is more powerful 
are so different. So focussing on interests cannot resolve the dispute unless a rights or 
power contest is followed. Similarly, the resolution of disputes of right takes place 
within the context of the parties’ power.14 For example, one party may win a 
judgement in court, but unless the judgement can be enforced against the more 
powerful party that refuses to implement it, the rights dispute will inevitably continue. 
The labour disputes are interest disputes that are caused by inherent conflicts of 
interest between capital and labour and are resolved by reconciling the opposing 
interests. Fewer disputes are disputes of right and are resolved by determining who is 
right and least disputes are disputes of power and are resolved by determining who is 
more powerful.15  
 
1.2  Conciliation  
 
Conciliation is negotiation in the presence and with the assistance of a neutral and 
impartial third party. 
In most legal jurisdictions including those of South Africa and Swaziland, conciliation 
is often prescribed as the first step of independent third party intervention in dispute 
resolution. For most disputes, conciliation is mandatory and must precede arbitration 
and adjudication in order to promote the resolution of the dispute by the parties 
themselves through collective bargaining. Thus, an arbitrator or judge has the legal 
power to refer the dispute referred to him back to the parties for further conciliation, if 
he or she is of the opinion that meaningful conciliation was not undertaken. 
  
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ury, Brett and Goldberg 18 25. 
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In many countries including South Africa, the term conciliation is used as a generic 
term for any consensual dispute resolution process, an approach which draws no 
distinction between conciliation, mediation, non-binding fact-finding and advisory 
arbitration. Thus, the terms conciliation, mediation and non-binding fact-finding are 
used interchangeably since in all three cases settlement of the dispute depends upon 
the agreement of the parties while in some countries including Swaziland, a 
distinction is made between them according to the degree of initiative/ activity taken 
by the independent third party.16 Hence, mediation, non-binding fact-finding are used 
as half-way stages between conciliation and arbitration and are used when conciliation 
has failed and the parties do not wish to have an imposed decision. Conciliation may 
be statutory and voluntary or statutory and compulsory or private and voluntary or 
private and compulsory. 
 
The conciliator is an independent third party who is free of the emotionalism of the 
parties, and helps to hold down emotionalism. He or she plays an advisory role. He or 
she is not a judge and does not make recommendations on what the agreement should 
be. His or her role is just to rebuild bridges and to establish common-ground between 
the parties by assisting the parties to narrow the real issues in dispute. But the 
conciliator does take jurisdictional decisions. The conciliator will usually meet the 
parties separately before trying to bring them together at the negotiation table. He or 
she brings the parties together under a new forum and helps them clarify and 
encourages them to discuss, their differences in order to reconcile them. He or she 
persuades the parties to make mutual compromises in order to reach agreement. He or 
she also assists them in developing their own proposed settlement agreement. 
 
Like mediation and fact-finding, conciliation is the furtherance of collective 
bargaining because it provides for a continuation of the negotiation process without 
interference of an independent third party. The decision is voluntarily made by the 
parties themselves. The conciliator does not make a judgement.17
 
Conciliation involves three steps: 
                                                 
16 ILO “Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures in Labour Disputes” (1980) Geneva 15. 
17 Ibid. 
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Step 1. The conciliator helps the parties clarify issues into issues in dispute and issues 
not in dispute so that discussions are limited to those issues that are in dispute; 
Step 2. The conciliator encourages and induces the parties to make offers, proposals 
and counter-proposals, which can serve as the basis of agreement. He or she also 
assists either party in formulating its proposals or counter-proposals; 
Step 3. If the parties fail to reach agreement on the basis of their own offers and 
counter-offers, the conciliator applies mediation or fact-finding: he or she submits to 
the parties his own non-binding proposal or recommendation for the settlement of the 
dispute. Parties are free to accept, vary or reject the conciliator’s proposal.18
 
Mediation and fact-finding are useful as a halfway stage between conciliation and 
arbitration and are used when conciliation has failed and the parties do not wish to 
have an imposed arbitration award or a ruling or a court judgement or court order. 
 
Although conciliation is better suited to the resolution of disputes of interest, it is 
nonetheless frequently used before arbitration and adjudication in order to facilitate 
the settlement of a dispute of right by acting as complainant. 
 
If conciliation succeeds in resolving the dispute, the terms of the settlement agreement 
are reduced to writing and after examination by the parties, are signed by both the 
parties and the conciliator and the signed agreement becomes binding upon all parties 
involved.  
 
1.3  Mediation 
 
Mediation is negotiation assisted by an independent third party, the mediator, who 
helps the parties by removing roadblocks so that negotiations can proceed through 
individual meetings/ caucuses with them as well as through joint open sessions. 
Mediation plays a vital role in resolving collective disputes of interest including wage 
and salary negotiation disputes, recognition disputes, retrenchment disputes and 
protest action disputes. 19 Like conciliation , non-binding fact-finding and advisory 
arbitration, mediation promotes the furtherance of collective bargaining because it 
                                                 
18 ILO “ Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures in Labour Disputes” 121. 
19 CMAC Annual Report 2005 16. 
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provides for the continuation of negotiations by the parties, so that the final decision is 
voluntarily made by the parties themselves and not by the independent third party, the 
mediator. 
 
The mediator who is free of the emotionalism of the parties, helps to hold down 
emotionalism of the parties and encourages the parties to acknowledge the other’s 
perspective. He plays a more active role than the conciliator in assisting the parties to 
find an acceptable solution, going as far as to suggest and submit his own non-binding 
recommendations to the parties which may be in the form of an advisory award for the 
settlement by the parties. The parties may decide through further negotiations whether 
they will adopt, vary or reject the recommendations. However, in most cases the 
recommendations are effected without variation. 
 
Where each side is reluctant to propose a compromise out of fear of appearing weak, 
the mediator can make such a proposal. Mediators are thus well-placed to shift the 
focus from rights or power to interests. Mediation can serve as a safety net to keep a 
dispute from escalating to a rights procedure such as litigation or to a power 
procedure such as  a  strike or lockout.20 Sometimes the mediator may prescribe a pre-
mediation conference of the parties to enable the mediator and the parties to come to a 
clear understanding of the issues in dispute, to agree on the procedures and programs 
to be followed, to agree on the venue, time and duration of the substantive mediation 
conferences. 
 
If mediation succeeds to resolve the dispute, the terms of the agreement are reduced to 
writing and after examination by the parties, are signed by both the parties and the 
mediator and the signed agreement becomes binding upon all the parties involved. 
 
Like conciliation, mediation is a private and confidential process and no information 
arising from it is disclosed by the parties or the mediator to any non-party. For 
example, if mediation fails to resolve the dispute and the dispute progresses to 
litigation or arbitration, no party to the dispute may call on the mediator to give 
evidence as to what occurred during the mediation proceedings. 
                                                 
20 Ury, Brett and Goldberg  49. 
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1.4  Non-binding Fact-finding 
 
Like conciliation and mediation, fact-finding aims at voluntary settlement by the 
parties themselves. It is the furtherance of collective bargaining because it provides 
for a continuation of the negotiation process without the interference of an 
independent third party, the independent fact-finder. Fact-finding is a variation of 
mediation. The independent fact-finder who is free of the emotionalism of the parties 
and who helps hold down emotionalism plays a more active role than a conciliator 
and mediator. Section 82(3) (b) (iii) of the Industrial Relations Act21   of Swaziland 
provides for fact-finding while section 135 (3) (a) and (b) of the 1995 Labour 
Relations Act (hereinafter “the LRA”)22 of South Africa provides for mediation and 
fact-finding. 
 
The fact-finder is given powers to clarify the facts concerning a dispute by 
investigating substantive facts (the history of the dispute and the positions of the 
parties) and submit a report on his findings of facts and recommendations for 
settlement for the benefit of the parties to the dispute and the public if the public 
welfare is seriously and adversely affected. Fact-finding is used in the hope that the 
new facts found and the recommendations that the report may carry (i) may help the 
parties reach agreement in their further negotiations or (ii) may enable the public to 
form an informed public opinion about the dispute which if the public opinion reveals 
that the demands are unreasonable, will exert pressure upon the parties to reach 
settlement. Public opinion may force a party to withdraw its unreasonable demand. 
Good recommendations may shift the burden of proof to the party that rejects them.23  
 
Once the facts are found, conciliation then continues based on the non-binding fact-
finding. Hence, if conciliation fails to resolve the dispute despite the consideration of 
the facts found, the parties to the dispute are free to proceed to, either, industrial 
action, arbitration or adjudication. 24  
                                                 
21 Of 2005. 
22 66 of 1995. 
23 ILO “Conciliation and arbitration Procedures in Labour Disputes” 133; Herman and Kuhn 
Collective Bargaining and Labour Relations (2005) 344. 
24 Brand et al   63. 
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1.5 Advisory Arbitration 
 
Advisory arbitration is a process by which a third party hears the dispute of the parties 
and then issues a non-binding advisory arbitration award which is used by the parties 
as the basis/ guide for further negotiations. In other words, advisory arbitration is 
arbitration that results in a non-binding arbitration award. Its purpose is to provide the 
parties to the dispute with information about the likely arbitration award if the dispute 
is taken to arbitration or court so as to encourage a negotiated resolution by reducing 
the parties’ uncertainties about an arbitrated or adjudicated decision. The advisory 
arbitration process is primarily adjudicative rather than conciliatory in nature.25
 
1.6 Arbitration 
 
Arbitration involves the appointment of an independent third party, who is free from 
the emotionalism of the parties to act as a “judge” or decision-maker in a dispute after 
an evidentiary hearing. In arbitration, the parties to the dispute relinquish their 
decision-making right to the arbitrator who makes a final and binding decision. Where 
arbitration is invoked by either party, the award of the arbitrator is not binding but 
where arbitration took place at the request of both parties who agree in advance to 
accept the arbitrator’s award, the arbitration award is binding.26  
 
Arbitration may be statutory and compulsory or statutory and voluntary. 
Alternatively, it could be private and compulsory or private and voluntary.  
Unlike conciliation, mediation, non-binding fact-finding and advisory arbitration, 
arbitration does not promote the furtherance of collective bargaining because it does 
not provide for the continuation of the negotiation process. The decision is not made 
by the parties themselves but is made by the arbitrator on behalf of the parties. The 
arbitrator’s award is binding and final and it disposes off the dispute finally. 
Nevertheless, voluntary arbitration may still be compatible with collective bargaining 
if both parties voluntarily agree to bring their dispute before the arbitrator and to be 
                                                 
25 Brand, Lotter, Mischke and Steadman Labour Dispute Resolution (2005) 58 – 65. 
26 Armstrong Personnel Management Practice (2005)  713. 
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bound by his award. A defective arbitration award is subject to review but not to 
appeal on merits. 
 
The arbitrator must give the parties an arbitration hearing to hear each side of the 
dispute in order to make the most objective judgement. An ex parte hearing may be 
allowed if the non-appearance of the party is completely unexplained or if a collective 
agreement or law provides that. Each party has a right to call witnesses, to cross-
examine adverse witnesses in order to discredit their evidence. The parties or the 
arbitrator may call expert witnesses such as a doctor to explain the effects of certain 
injuries and an engineer to explain the workings of machines. All witnesses who are 
to testify may be sequestrated. The arbitrator and the witnesses may take oath to show 
the seriousness of the proceedings.27  
 
The arbitral process uses the rules of evidence and procedure but not as rigidly, 
formally and rigorously as a court of law. While resembling adjudication, it remains a 
quasi-judicial process rather than adjudication. Evidence may be oral, documentary, 
original, duplicative or demonstrative (such as maps, drawings, diagrams, 
photographs, movies and models). In arbitration proceedings, any party is expected to 
prove that something occurred or did not occur on a balance of probabilities. A party 
is not expected to prove that something occurred or did not occur beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
 
When making his final judgement, an arbitrator may use conventional arbitration in 
which his judgement may occupy the middle ground between the two final offers of 
the union and the employer. Alternatively, the arbitrator may use pendulum arbitration 
in which the arbitrator reviews the two final offers of the union and the employer and 
selects one of the two final offers of the union and the employer as a final settlement. 
There is no middle ground in this case.28  
 
1.7  Adjudication by Courts of Law 
 
                                                 
27 s 138 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
28 Armstrong 136. 
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Judicial adjudication is a procedure whereby special labour courts or ordinary courts 
settle finally any disputes of right channelled through the judicial system within which 
courts of law operate. Under judicial settlement, the parties to the dispute incur costs 
and delays normally associated with the judicial procedure. It is for this reason that 
most parties prefer conciliation and arbitration to judicial adjudication.29 In the court 
adjudication process the stringent procedures are highly structured and 
institutionalised, typified by detailed rules and numerous compliance mechanisms. 
Court adjudication yields final and binding decisions, judgements or orders that are 
appeal able. 
 
1.8  Conclusion 
The least formal of the dispute resolution processes is negotiation while the most 
formal and final of the dispute resolution processes is court adjudication as shown by 
figure 4 below which shows a spectrum of dispute resolution processes. The dispute 
resolution processes are inter-related: the dispute being mediated, arbitrated or 
adjudicated must be the same substantive dispute that was initially conciliated.30   
 
Figure 2: A Spectrum of Dispute Resolution Processes 
Least Formal   
    
• Negotiation  
• Conciliation  
• Mediation  
• Non-binding Fact-finding  
• Advisory Arbitration  
• Hybrid Conciliation-arbitration/mediation-arbitration 
• Arbitration  
• Court Adjudication  
Most Formal  
 
 
                                                 
29 ILO “Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures in Labour Disputes” 1 and 15. 
30 NUMSA v Driveline Technologies Ltd 2000 1 BLLR 20 (LAC). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
2.1  Background and History 
 
During the pre-industrial era 31 there were no collective labour relations in South 
Africa and employment relationships were governed by the Master and Servants 
Act32. During this period Blacks were employed as servants and labourers on low pay 
on the farms and in towns while Whites, who included, Coloureds and Asians were 
employed as skilled workers on significantly higher pay. 
 
In the early years of industrialization that began in 1870 when Diamonds were 
discovered in the mines both white and black mineworkers were not able to organize 
themselves collectively into trade unions but later whites were able after the 
employment of skilled British immigrants that brought with them the British brand of 
trade unionism. 
 
The first white union on the mines was founded in 1892 and the first strike by Whites 
on the gold mine was successfully organized in 1897 to prevent the Chamber of 
Mines from reducing wages after the Chamber of Mines had discovered that with 
increased mechanisation many skilled jobs that were traditionally reserved for the 
expensive and skilled whites, which included coloureds and Asians could now be 
done by the cheaper and unskilled or semi-skilled black labour.  In response to the 
strike by white mineworkers, the government introduced the first Industrial colour bar 
that prevented black workers from performing skilled and supervisory jobs, for 
example, being engine drivers or team leaders. 
 
                                                 
31 That was before 1870, the year in which Diamonds were discovered in South Africa. 
32  Of 1841 and its subsequent amendments in 1856.  
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The history of statutory labour dispute resolution in South Africa dates back to the 
early nineteenth century, when the Transvaal Disputes Prevention Act 33 was 
promulgated which applied only to the Transvaal.  It provided for the appointment of 
ad hoc boards of conciliation and investigation in certain specified industries and to 
those to which the Governor applied the relevant provisions by proclamation. 
The revolt of white mineworkers on the Rand in 1922 propelled the government to 
introduce South Africa’s first comprehensive piece of labour legislation, the Industrial 
Conciliation Act 34 that dealt somewhat comprehensively with labour disputes, 
although it did not apply to black workers.  The statute introduced a sound statutory 
system of voluntary collective bargaining and labour dispute settlement for white 
workers35only because black workers were not considered employees due to their 
exclusion from the statutory definition of employee.   
 
The mechanisms of the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 were primarily suited to resolve 
disputes of interest. Interest disputes were referred to industrial councils or 
conciliation boards (where no industrial council existed) for conciliation.  If the 
dispute remained unresolved, employees were able to strike and employers to lock 
workers out after a cooling off period of 30 days.  Strikes and lockouts were 
prohibited until the issue in dispute had been conciliated. 
 
Industrial councils and conciliation boards could substantially perform conciliation 
and to a very limited extent could perform arbitration. In terms of section 7 of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act 37 a majority of employer representatives and a majority of 
employee representatives on an industrial council or conciliation board could agree to 
the appointment of one or more arbitrators to arbitrate a dispute of right.  This was 
voluntary arbitration of disputes of right in non-essential services. 
 
Compulsory arbitration of disputes of right and of interest was introduced only in 
essential services, where strikes were forbidden.  In non – essential services, 
arbitration of disputes of right remained voluntary. Hence, many disputes of right had 
                                                 
33 20 of 1909. 
34 11 of 1924. 
35 White workers comprised Whites, Asians and Coloureds only.  African workers were excluded. 
36 11 of 1924. 
37 11 of 1924. 
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to be referred to the ordinary courts to be adjudicated on the basis of the law of 
contract. 
The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 38 provided for the extension of industrial 
council agreements to cover black workers, even though they were not directly 
represented on the Industrial Councils or Conciliation Boards.  Black workers were 
still not granted direct representation in the official collective bargaining and dispute 
resolution bodies.39  
 
The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 40 brought further improvement by 
allowing indirect representation of black workers’ interests on industrial councils by 
representatives of the Department of Labour.  However, the representation of black 
worker interests remained poor.41  
 
The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 42 created a separate official collective 
bargaining and dispute resolution machinery for black workers in the form of plant 
based works committees, regional native labour committees and a Central Native 
Labour Board.43 The functions of these workers committees were confined to 
reporting and dispute resolution and operated under strict government control. 
 
The committee system remained the only legitimized form of black worker 
representation until 1979. Very few black workers took the initiative to form these 
committees which they considered to be a manipulative strategy by the government 
because: 
(i) The black members of the committee were appointed by the Minister of 
Labour – a white  
(ii) The chairperson was a white  
(iii) The Black Labour board to which the regional committees were to report had 
an all white membership.44 
 
                                                 
38 Of 1930. 
39 Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa (2005) 333. 
40 Of 1937. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Of 1953. 
43 ss 3, 4 and 7. 
44 Bendix 334. 
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The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act,45 which later became known as the 
Labour Relations Act of 1956 created an industrial tribunal to arbitrate disputes on 
a voluntary basis in non- essential services when requested to do so by parties to 
industrial councils or conciliation boards and to arbitrate disputes on a compulsory 
basis in essential services. 
 
The spontaneous outbreak of numerous illegal strikes by large numbers of 
unorganized black workers in Durban and later in Cape Town and the Transvaal in 
1972 and 1973 challenged the dual industrial relations system and the apartheid 
regime.  The government responded extremely rapidly to the 1973 strike wave of 
Black workers by passing the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act 46which 
established liaison committees at plant level as an alternative to the already 
existing workers committees.  Liaison committees were to consist of 
representatives of employers and employees elected on a parity basis.  Liaison 
Committees and not workers committees could send representatives to industrial 
councils for collective bargaining and dispute resolution. 
 
The Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 47 also gave black workers limited 
freedom to strike by setting up disputes resolution machinery for blacks.  Before 
black workers could legally strike a dispute was first of all to be sent to the Black 
Labour Officer responsible for that area and from there to the Regional Labour 
Commissioner and from there to the Divisional Inspector and finally to the Black 
Labour Board.  Many black unions and employees did not favour this very long 
procedure which they saw as an attempt by the Apartheid government to break the 
power of black trade unionism.48
 
As a result of the practical unworkability of the dual system of Labour relations, 
the threat of sanctions and disinvestment by overseas countries, protest action by 
black workers and some white workers in the form of political and industrial 
unrest such as the 1976 riots, the government appointed the Wiehahn Commission 
                                                 
45 Of 1956. 
46 Of 1973. 
47 Of 1973. 
48 Bendix 340. 
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of Inquiry in 1977 to inquire into acceptable labour legislation and make 
recommendations in that regard.  
 
As a result of the Wiehahn Recommendations: 
i. The industrial tribunal was replaced with an industrial court that had an extensive 
unfair labour practice jurisdiction.  Because of the open-ended nature of the unfair 
labour practice definition, the Industrial Court was in essence law making in 
nature. 
ii. Disputes other than unfair  labour practice disputes could still be resolved through 
conciliation by the industrial council or conciliation board and could then be 
referred to voluntary arbitration or compulsory arbitration in terms of the 
Arbitration  Act 49 or the parties could strike or lockout if the dispute was an 
interest dispute in non-essential services;  
iii. Works councils replaced workers committees;  
iv. The statutory term employee was redefined to include black workers.  Black 
workers and their unions were allowed for the first time to join registered trade 
unions and be directly represented on industrial councils or conciliation boards, 
thus ending the dual system of labour relations. 
 
However, when the statutory collective bargaining and dispute resolution system was 
opened to black trade unions in 1979, black unions did not, as was anticipated, seek to 
join industrial councils or conciliation boards, but continued to organize, seek 
recognition and bargain at the non-statutory plant-level which they used under the 
committee system. 
In this way black trade unions succeeded to establish plant level collective bargaining 
and dispute resolution to supplement the industrial council system of collective 
bargaining and dispute resolution.  Many trade unions now make a choice as to the 
level at which they would bargain. The choice is between industrial council level and 
plant level.50
 
                                                 
49  42 of 1965. 
50 Bendix 408-418. 
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The Industrial Court, industrial councils and conciliation boards had cumbersome, 
slow and overly technical procedures that called for an overhaul of labour legislation 
and this resulted in enactment of the LRA 51
 
2.2 The Present Statutory System 
 
2.2.1 Acquisition of Statutory Conciliation Jurisdiction  
 
After referral of a dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (hereinafter the “the commission”) or where the Commission elects to 
conciliate an unreferred dispute in public interest, a commissioner must determine if 
the Commission has jurisdiction to conciliate that dispute prior to commencing 
conciliation.  Unlike the Labour Court and the High Court which have inherent 
jurisdictions to adjudicate, the Commission does not have inherent jurisdiction to 
conciliate but must acquire such jurisdiction in each case. 
 
The Commission may decline to appoint a commissioner only if it lacks jurisdiction to 
conciliate.  Should the commission attempt to resolve any labor dispute when it does 
not have jurisdiction, it would act ultra vires.  On the contrary, should the commission 
refuse to appoint a commissioner when it has assumed jurisdiction, a party may apply 
to the Labor Court to compel the Commission to appoint a commissioner to conciliate 
the dispute. 
 
The Commission has conciliation jurisdiction if,  
i. There is an unresolved labour dispute and the internal dispute resolution procedure 
has been exhausted; 
ii. The dispute is referred to the Commission by a party to the dispute; and 
iii. The dispute is not subject to an agreed collective agreement dispute resolution 
procedure since the Commission is the residual and not the primary dispute 
resolution agency where the dispute falls under an area/ industry where there is an 
accredited bargaining council, accredited statutory council or an accredited private 
                                                 
51 66 of 1995. 
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agency. 52  Where the dispute is subject to a collective agreement dispute 
resolution procedure the Commission should decline jurisdiction and refer the 
dispute to the correct forum for it to be dealt with in accordance with the 
collective agreement procedure. Nevertheless, the Commission may exercise its 
discretion to take jurisdiction and appoint a commissioner to resolve the dispute 53 
because the Commission has residual jurisdiction as well as discretionary 
concurrent jurisdiction in relation to private dispute resolution institutions. 
 
Section 127(2) of the Labour Relations Act54 lists the dispute as one of the listed 
disputes that an accredited bargaining/ statutory council or accredited private agency 
does not have jurisdiction to conciliate and/ arbitrate but must be referred to the 
Commission for conciliation/ arbitration. Examples of these listed disputes include, 
inter alia, disputes about organisational rights,55 disputes about collective agreements 
where the collective agreement does not provide for a procedure, the procedure is 
inoperative or any party frustrates the resolution of the dispute,56disputes about 
agency shops and closed shops,57disputes about the determinations made by the 
Minister in respect of proposals made by a statutory council,58disputes about the 
interpretation or application of collective agreements of a council whose registration 
has been cancelled,59 and disputes about the demarcation of sectors and areas of 
councils;60
 
The referral must also be timeous in terms of the statutory time limits, the CCMA 
rules or the reasonableness of the time that has passed or, if not, condonation has been 
applied for and granted;61 otherwise the Commission has no jurisdiction to conciliate 
the dispute. The signed application for condonation for the late referral of a dispute 
must set out the grounds for seeking condonation which may include the reasons for 
and the degree of lateness; the referring party’s prospects of succeeding with the 
                                                 
52 s 127 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
53 s147 (1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
54 66 of 1995. 
55 ss 16, 21 and 22 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
56 s 24(2) to (5) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
57 ss 24(6) and (7) and 26(ii) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
58 s45 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
59 s61(5) to (8) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
60 s62 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
61 CCMA rule 9; s191 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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referral and obtaining the relief sought; the prejudice to the other party; public 
interest; the seriousness or importance of the matter such as a discrimination dispute, 
and the number of employees affected;62
It is also required that the dispute must have arisen after the commencement of the 
new LRA on 11 November 1996. The Commission does not have jurisdiction to 
conciliate a dispute that arose before the LRA came into operation. Such disputes 
must be dealt with as if those laws had not been repealed;63  
A further requirement is that there is a valid referral which complies with the referral 
requirements such as using a properly signed referral form64 and accompanied by a 
signed application for condonation where condonation is required;65
Finally, the Commission must have territorial jurisdiction to conciliate the dispute.66
 
2.2.2. The statutory Conciliation Process 
 
Statutory conciliation is either a compulsory67 by which a conciliator appointed by 
the Commission, a bargaining council, a statutory council or an accredited private 
agency, conciliates a dispute between parties by means of any consensus-building 
process such as conciliation, mediation, fact-finding or the making of non-binding 
recommendations which may be in the form of a non-binding advisory arbitration.68
 
Statutory conciliation is governed by the LRA69 and the procedural rules of the 
Commission.70 Conciliation conducted in terms of the LRA71 is a compulsory process 
unless all the parties to a dispute agree differently. All residual disputes not handled 
by private procedures or accredited bargaining councils or agencies must be referred 
to the Commission for conciliation before they can be referred to arbitration or before 
the parties could use power in the form of strikes or lockouts. If a dispute referred to 
                                                 
62 CCMA rule 9. 
63 Sch. 7 item 21(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
64 LRA 7.1 Referral form. 
65 CCMA rule 9(2). 
66 CCMA rule 24. 
67 Statutory conciliation is a compulsory process in that if one party refers a dispute to statutory 
conciliation, the other party is compelled to attend the conciliation hearing. 
68 s 135(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995; Brand, Lotter, Mischke and Steadman Labour Dispute Resolution 
(2005) 58. 
69 66 of 1995. 
70 CCMA rules. 
71 66 of 1995. 
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arbitration has not been conciliated, the Commission will lack jurisdiction to arbitrate 
the matter. On the other hand, most disputes must be referred to the Commission for 
conciliation before they can be referred to adjudication by the Labour Court. If a 
dispute referred to arbitration has not been conciliated, the omission will lack 
jurisdiction to arbitrate the matter. Proof of service of the referral form on the other 
parties must be attached to the signed referral form when the dispute is referred to the 
Commission. 
 
Once the Commission has established that it has jurisdiction to conciliate the dispute, 
it must appoint a commissioner to attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation 
which may include mediation, fact-finding and advice72 within 30 days of the date 
the Commission received the referral or within such extended period agreed upon by 
the parties.73 A conciliating commissioner has no arbitral powers. He cannot force 
the parties to settle. His function is solely to assist parties to reach a settlement 
agreement. The conciliator can call the parties to joint meetings or can call the parties 
to separated side-meetings if a joint meeting is not conducive due to high levels of 
anger, emotion or abuse or if there is need for confidential discussions between the 
conciliator and a party. Parties may request time to caucus on their own.74 If a 
commissioner has been appointed in respect of more than one dispute involving the 
same parties, he may consolidate the conciliation proceedings on his own accord or 
on application by a party so that all the disputes are dealt with in the same 
proceedings.75
 
Conciliation proceedings are regarded as private and confidential; informal and 
flexible and are conducted on a “without prejudice” basis. This means that the 
evidence submitted, the arguments made and the settlement offers made during 
conciliation cannot be referred to and used against any party in subsequent 
proceedings such as arbitration or adjudication in order to make judgement unless the 
parties agree in writing.76  The Commission may not disclose to any person or in any 
court any information, knowledge or document that it acquired on a confidential basis 
                                                 
72 s135 (1) of the LRA 66 0f 1995. 
73 s135 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
74 Brand et al ‘Labour Dispute Resolution’ 80. 
75 s135 (3A) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
76 Hofmeyr v Network Health Care Holdings Ltd 2004 3 BLLR 232 (LC); CCMA rule 16. 
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or without prejudice.77 Only the parties themselves may attend conciliation 
proceedings. Outsiders like legal practitioners have no right of appearance at 
conciliation meetings, as there is no provision for legal representation at 
conciliation.78
 
If the parties reach an agreement at the conciliation stage on some or all of the 
disputed issues, the conciliating commissioner must assist the parties in drawing up a 
written settlement agreement which must be signed by all the parties to the dispute 
with the commissioner in attendance. The commissioner must then issue a certificate 
of resolution to indicate that the matter has been resolved even if the 30-day or any 
extension thereof has not expired. The commissioner must file the original certificate 
with the Commission and serve a copy thereof on all parties.79
 
The issue of a certificate of resolution ends the matter and neither party can pursue the 
settled dispute further, unless the conciliating commissioner acted irregularly and the 
certificate is set aside on review by the Labour Court. The Commission may, by 
agreement between the parties or on application by a party, make any written 
settlement an arbitration award, provided it is in respect of a dispute that may be 
referred to arbitration or to the Labour Court on failure of conciliation to settle the 
dispute. This power of the Commission does not cover interest disputes in non-
essential and non-maintenance services and it also does not cover both right and 
interest disputes in essential and maintenance service.80 A settlement agreement made 
at conciliation may also be made an order of court.81 At the end of the 30-day 
conciliation period or any agreed extension thereof or when conciliation has failed, 
the conciliating commissioner must issue a certificate of non-resolution which 
establishes that conciliation has failed or the conciliation period has expired without 
any settlement agreement reached. Similarly, if the Commission does not appoint a 
commissioner to conciliate within the 30-day conciliation period or the agreed 
extension thereof or the commissioner is appointed but does not attempt to resolve the 
dispute, conciliation is deemed to have failed and a certificate of non-resolution must 
                                                 
77 s126 (3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
 
78 CCMA rule 25. 
79 s135 (5) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
80 s142A of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
81 s158 (1) (c) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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be issued. If the dispute is certified unresolved, the parties may give notice of a strike 
or lockout if it is a dispute of interest in non-essential or non-maintenance services or 
refer the matter for arbitration or to the Labour Court as the case may be. 
 
In order to be protected, strikes and lockouts must comply with either the statutory 
strike and lockout procedure set out in section 64 of the Labour Relations Act 82 or a 
recognition/ collective agreement strike and lockout procedure or a council’s 
constitution.83 This means that strikers have a choice of following the statutory strike 
procedure or a recognition/ collective agreement strike procedure for a strike to be 
protected. The statutory procedure requires the following steps to be complied with 
before employees may strike or the employer may lock employees out; 
i. The issue in dispute must have been referred either to a bargaining council or to 
the Commission for conciliation. 
ii. A certificate of non-resolution must have been issued or a period of 30 days must 
have elapsed from the date of referral of the dispute, whichever occurs first; 
iii. After the lapse of the prescribed conciliation period the other party to the dispute 
must be given at least 48 hours’ written notice of the commencement of the strike 
or lockout or 7 days written notice if the employer is the State. The strike notice to 
the employer must specify the precise time of commencement of the strike.  
iv. The issue in dispute over which the employees ultimately strike must be same as 
that over which conciliation took place. 
 
However, there are exceptions to the need for strikers to comply with the strike and 
lockout procedure. Strikers need not comply with the statutory pre-strike procedure 
where: 
i. The strike is in response to an illegal lockout by the employer;  
ii. The employer has introduced a unilateral change to the employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment and has failed to comply with a request that it either 
refrains from implementing the change or revokes the change for 30 days;  
iii. The dispute has been dealt with in terms of the council’s constitution or a 
collective agreement strike/ lockout procedure. 
 
                                                 
82 66 of 1995. 
83 County Fair Foods Ltd v FAWU 2001 5 BLLR 494 (LAC). 
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The right to strike or lockout is limited by the fact that a person may not participate in 
a strike or lockout if:  
i. that person is engaged in an essential or maintenance service;  
ii. The issue in dispute is one that a party has a right to refer to arbitration or to the 
Labour Court;  
iii. That person is bound by a collective agreement that requires the issue in dispute to 
be referred to arbitration;  
iv. That person is bound by a collective agreement that prohibits a strike or lockout in 
respect of the issue in dispute.  
 
2.2.3.   Statutory Conciliation-arbitration84
 
Con-arb is a hybrid process by which parties to a dispute agree at the commencement 
of the dispute resolution procedure that should conciliation fail to resolve the dispute, 
they will go to a single independent third party, for a joint conciliation-arbitration 
process, who first conciliates the dispute and if conciliation fails to resolve the dispute 
the conciliating commissioner immediately/ automatically changes roles and becomes 
arbitrator and arbitrates the dispute. Conciliation occurs first and if it is unsuccessful 
in resolving the dispute, the conciliator immediately changes roles and becomes an 
arbitrator and immediately arbitrates the dispute. Con-arb takes place as a continuous 
process on the same day.85 The same independent third party is both a conciliator and 
arbitrator with respect to the same dispute. Alternatively, the roles of conciliator and 
arbitrator may be assumed by different independent third parties. 
 
Con-arb is an expedited labour dispute resolution procedure that is used only in the 
resolution of dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes. The purpose of 
conciliation-arbitration is to reduce the cost, work load and delay arising from the 
separation between conciliation and arbitration proceedings. The Con-arb process is 
governed by the same rules and principles as conciliation (regarding the conciliation 
aspect) and arbitration (regarding the arbitration aspect). 
 
                                                 
84 Conciliation –arbitration is abbreviated as con-arb. 
85 CCMA Annual Report 2003/ 2003 8. 
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In terms of section 191(5A) of the LRA 86 a failure of conciliation must be followed 
by arbitration conducted by the same or a different conciliating commissioner 
immediately or automatically once a certificate of non- resolution has been issued.  
i. In all dismissal or unfair labour practice disputes relating to probationary period 
employees. Conciliation-arbitration is compulsory for probation disputes and no 
party may object to conciliation-arbitration and demand conciliation-then-
arbitration; 87 the rationale is to speedily resolve the labour dispute before the 
probationary period has expired. 
ii. In all other dismissal or unfair labour practice disputes that the Commission is 
allowed to arbitrate, provided no party objects thereto.88  Con-arb is voluntary for 
such other disputes and any party may object to conciliation-arbitration by 
delivering a written objection to the Commission and the other party at least seven 
days prior to the date of the conciliation-arbitration.89 By objecting to Con-arb the 
objecting party is simply saying the matter must be referred to arbitration at a later 
date.90 
 
Legal representation is allowed in Con-arb including the conciliation stage of 
conciliation-arbitration except if the dispute concerns alleged unfair dismissal 
related to the employee’s conduct or capacity. In such cases of unfair dismissal for 
conduct or capacity, legal representation is permitted only if the parties and the 
commissioner agree to legal representation or the Commissioner believes that it 
would be unreasonable to expect a party to deal with arbitration without legal 
representation after considering the: 
i. nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute; 
ii. the complexity of the dispute; 
iii. the public interest; and 
iv. the relative ability of the opposing parties to deal with the dispute.91   
                                                 
86 66 of 1995. 
87 Conciliation-then-arbitration which is abbreviated as con-the-arb refers to a process whereby parties 
to a dispute agree to go first to a single conciliator for conciliation and if conciliation fails to resolve 
the dispute they agree to go to a different arbitrator for final and binding arbitration at a later date. 
Alternatively, the parties may agree to go to a single conciliator-cum- arbitrator who first conciliates 
the dispute and if conciliation fails, he arbitrates the dispute at a later date.      
88 s191 (5A) ( c) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
89 CCMA rule 17(2). 
90 Brand et al ‘Labour Dispute Resolution’ 62. 
91 CCMA rule 25© (1) and (2). 
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2.2.4. Acquisition of Statutory Arbitration Jurisdiction  
 
Unlike the Labour Court and the High Court, the Commission does not have inherent 
jurisdiction to conciliate or arbitrate but it acquires arbitration jurisdiction in each 
case. A commissioner may exercise only those powers given by the Labour Relations 
Act, any other Act of Parliament, the parties, the Labour Court or the Commission 
rules which are a subordinate legislation. The Commission has residual as well as 
discretionary concurrent jurisdiction with the council to arbitrate dismissal and unfair 
labour practice disputes.92 The Commission also has exclusive93 jurisdiction to 
arbitrate disputes about organizational rights, workplace forums, agency and closed 
shop agreements, ministerial determinations, demarcation of sectors, collective 
agreements of de-registered council and disputes about the interpretation or 
application of collective agreements that do not contain a labour dispute resolution 
procedure, or that contain an inoperative labour dispute resolution procedure, or that 
contain a labour dispute resolution procedure that is frustrated by a party. 
 
If a dispute remains unresolved after conciliation, the Commission must appoint a 
commissioner to arbitrate the dispute if: 
i. the LRA 94 requires the dispute to be arbitrated by the Commission and any party 
to the dispute has requested that the dispute be resolved through arbitration and a 
commissioner appointed to conciliate the dispute has issued a certificate of non-
resolution and any party to the dispute has requested that the dispute be resolved 
through arbitration;95 This is compulsory statutory arbitration; 
ii. All the parties to the dispute in respect of which the Labour Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction to adjudicate have consented in writing to arbitration under the 
auspices of the Commission96 as an alternative to adjudication. This serves time 
and money. This is voluntary statutory arbitration. In the absence of the written 
consent of all the parties, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to arbitrate 
                                                 
92 s191(5) (a) of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
93 Council cannot conciliate or arbitrate these disputes and the Labour Court cannot adjudicate these 
disputes; SA CCAWU v Speciality Stores Ltd 1898  4 BLLR 352 (LAC). 
94 66 of 1995. 
95 s136 (1) (a) and (b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
96 ss141(1) and 133 (2) (b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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the ad judicable dispute(s) that is not arbitrable but must refer it to the Labour 
Court for adjudication; 
iii. proof is enclosed that the referral to arbitration was served on the other parties to 
the dispute;  
iv. the signed referral document is timeous or if it is not , an application for 
condonation is attached;97  
v. the request for arbitration was signed by the correct person such as the party to the 
dispute or his legally recognised representative;98 
vi. a certificate of non-resolution was issued by a conciliation commissioner within 
90 days or some other extended period condoned by the Commission, after the 
date on which the certificate was issued and is attached to the arbitration referral 
form;99 If a matter referred to arbitration has not been conciliated,100, the 
Commission will lack jurisdiction to arbitrate the matter; 
vii. arbitration is not conducted in terms of the Arbitration Act 101 because the 
Arbitration Act102 does not apply to any arbitration under the auspices of the 
Commission103 
 
The appointed arbitrating commissioner could be the same commissioner who 
conciliated the dispute.104 However, either party to the dispute may object in writing 
to the appointment of the same conciliating commissioner to arbitrate the dispute by 
completing LRA Form 7.14 and serving a copy of the objection to the other parties 
and lodging the original with the Commission.105
 
The Labour Court may also acquire jurisdiction to arbitrate a dispute with the consent 
of the parties to an arbitration agreement.106 In such a case, the Labour Court acts as 
an arbitrator and only makes an order corresponding to the award that an arbitrator 
could have made. 
                                                 
97 CCMA rule 18(2)©. 
98 CCMA rule 18(2)(a). 
99 LRA form7.13. 
100 An attempt at conciliation is sufficient: meaningful conciliation is not required. 
101 42 of 1965. 
102 42 of 1965. 
103 s146 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
104 s136(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
105 s136(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
106 An arbitration agreement is an agreement to arbitrate a dispute that is supposed to be adjudicated by 
the Labour Court; s141 (5) (a) (ii) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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2.2.5. The Statutory Arbitration Process. 
   
Arbitration conducted in terms of the Labour Relations Act 107 is compulsory unless 
all the parties to a dispute agree differently. The Commission must conduct the 
arbitration hearing in a manner that the commissioner deems appropriate in order to 
determine the dispute fairly and quickly with a minimum of legal formalities.108  
While arbitration proceedings are not judicial in nature, the arbitrator is still required 
to observe the rules of natural justice 109 and accord natural justice to any parties 
appearing before him.110
 
 The Arbitration Act 111 does not apply to arbitration conducted under the auspices of 
the Commission. 112
 
If arbitration is compulsory, any party to the dispute may apply to the director of the 
Commission by completing form LRA 7.15 to appoint a senior commissioner to 
arbitrate the dispute.113 The director of the Commission may require proof of service 
of the application on the other party before hearing the application. The director may 
grant the application or confirm the appointment of the commissioner initially 
appointed114 after having considered the questions of law raised by the dispute, the 
complexity of the dispute, any conflicting arbitration awards on similar disputes that 
need to be resolved, and public interest,115 and after hearing the parties to the dispute 
and the Commissioner who conciliated the dispute.116
 
Upon failure of conciliation to resolve a dispute of interest or right in essential 
services, the dispute must be arbitrated by council or the Commission117 because 
                                                 
107 66 of 1995. 
108 s138 (1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
109 Rules of natural justice are really rules of common sense such as listening to both parties, having no 
personal interest in the matter. 
110 Breen and Steward  Labour Law: An Introduction (2005) 101. 
111 42 of 1965. 
112 s146 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
113 s137(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
114 s137(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
115 s137(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
116 s137(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
117 s74(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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strikes and lockouts are prohibited in essential services.118 If the referring party fails 
to appear at the arbitration hearing, the Commissioner may dismiss the matter by 
issuing a ruling.119 This disposes of the case finally. On the other hand, if the 
respondent fails to appear, the commissioner must decide whether to hear the matter 
in his absence or postpone it to a later date.120
 
Although a pre-arbitration conference of the parties to the dispute is not compulsory 
in terms of the Commission rules121, it becomes compulsory if ordered by the Director 
of the Commission and parties are bound by the ensuing pre-arbitration agreement. 
Legal representation is allowed in arbitration proceedings122 except in alleged unfair 
dismissal disputes relating to the employee’s conduct or capacity. In this case, legal 
representation is allowed if the commissioner and all the parties consent thereto or the 
commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a party to carry out with the 
dispute of alleged unfair dismissal without legal representation.123
 
A pre-arbitration conference is procedurally held by the parties to the dispute in the 
same way a pre-trial conference. One of the parties to the dispute chairs the pre-
arbitration hearing and also takes the pre-arbitration minutes. At the pre-arbitration 
conference/ pre-trial conference, the parties discuss and sign a pre-arbitration/ pre-trial 
minutes on several issues.124
 
Upon completion of the pre-arbitration/ pre-trial conference the parties, the parties 
give the pre-arbitration/ pre-trial minutes to read out to the parties in summary form in 
order to confirm that what is written down in the minutes is a true record of what was 
agreed upon by the parties during the pre-arbitration/ pre-trial proceedings 
 
Upon confirmation of pre-arbitration/ pre-trial minutes, the arbitrator, judge orders the 
parties to sign the pre-arbitration/ pre-trial minutes which are the copied and served on 
the parties. 
                                                 
118 s65(d)(i) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
119 s138 (5) (a) of the LRA 66 of 1995; CCMA rule 30(1) (a). 
120 s138 (5)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
121 CCMA rule 20. 
122 CCMA rule 25(b) (i). 
123 CCMA rule 25©(1). 
124 CCMA rule 20. 
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The actual arbitration hearing is usually characterised by the following step-by-step 
procedure: 
i. The making of oral or written opening statements in turn by each of the parties to 
the dispute. The referring party usually speaks first and delivers a statement of 
case while the respondent usually speaks second and delivers an answering 
statement. The introduction of parties is usually included in the opening statement. 
Evidence should not be given during the opening statement; 
ii. Leading of evidence-in-chief, in turn by each of the parties to the dispute.125 
Common sources of evidence-in-chief are witnesses and facts agreed between the 
parties. The purpose of evidence-in-chief is to place evidence before the arbitrator/ 
judge to prove the issues which are in dispute so that you can ask the arbitrator/ 
judge to make judgement in your favour; 
iii. calling and swearing of the witnesses; 126   
iv. direct examination of the applicant and the applicant’s witnesses by the applicant 
himself/ by the applicant’s representative; 
v. cross-examination 127 of the applicant and the applicant’s witnesses by the 
respondent/ by the respondent’s representative; 
vi. cross-examination of the applicant and the applicant’s witnesses by the arbitrator/ 
judge 
vii. re-direct examination of the applicant and the applicant’s witnesses by the 
applicant/  the applicant’s representative; 
viii. re-cross examination of the applicant and the applicant’s witnesses by the 
respondent/ the respondent’s representative; 
ix. re-cross examination of the applicant and the applicant’s witnesses by the 
arbitrator/ judge 
x. direct examination of the respondent and the respondent’s witnesses by the 
respondent/ by the respondent’s representative; 
xi. cross-examination of the respondent and the respondent’s witnesses by the 
applicant/ by the applicant’s representative; 
                                                 
125 s138 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
126 s138 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
127 s138 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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xii. cross-examination of the respondent and the respondent’s witnesses by the 
arbitrator/ judge; 
xiii.  re-direct examination of the respondent and the respondent’s witnesses by the 
respondent/ by the respondent’s representative; 
xiv. re-cross examination of the respondent and the respondent’s witnesses by the 
applicant/ by the applicant’s representative; 
xv. re-cross examination of the respondent and the respondent’s witnesses by the 
arbitrator/ judge; 
xvi. the making of closing arguments128 in turn, by each of the parties to the dispute/ 
by their respective representatives, without interruption. The purpose of a closing 
argument is to try to convince the arbitrator/ judge to decide in your favour on the 
basis of the evidence (and not the arguments) before him submitted during the 
making of arguments. Arguments are not used as a basis for deciding in the favour 
of one party.  The making of closing arguments typically involves identifying and 
analysing the key evidence, applying the law to the facts to prove on a balance of 
probabilities for the arbitrator/ judge to judge in your favour, counteracting the 
other side’s arguments served to you and outlining the relief sought such as 
compensation, payment of damages, re-instatement or re-employment. 
 
The LRA 129is silent on whether arbitration proceedings are open to the public. 
However, in terms of section 34 of the Constitution,130 arbitration by the Commission 
is a public hearing because the Commission is subject to the Constitution which 
provides that everyone has the constitutional right to have a dispute resolved by the 
application of the law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or other 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum. In the light of this provision a 
commissioner does not generally have the power to exclude a person from the 
arbitration hearing, unless such exclusion is reasonable and justifiable.131
 
The final output of the arbitration process is the issuing of a final and binding 
arbitration award by the arbitrating commissioner usually within 14 days of the 
conclusion of the arbitration proceedings or within some other extended period, 
                                                 
128 s138 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
129 66 of 1995. 
130 108 of 1996. 
131 s36 of the Constitution  108 of 1996. 
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extended by the Commission Director. An arbitration award is final and binding, but 
is only subject to review in the Labour Court but not to appeal. A review only looks 
at/ focuses on the manner in which the decision was reached rather than the decision 
itself. On the other hand, in the case of an appeal, the merits and facts of the case are 
re-heard and the new decision is taken on the merits and the facts of the case.  
Arbitrating commissioners are bound to follow relevant decisions of the Labour 
Court, the Labour Appeal Court and the Constitutional Court as precedents.  Re-
instatement, compensation and damages are examples of arbitration awards that may 
be issued by an arbitrator. The arbitrating commissioner must issue an arbitration 
award or ruling with brief reasons.132
 
The arbitrating commissioner must serve a copy of the arbitration award on each party 
to the dispute and the Commissioner must file the original with the registrar of the 
Labour Court.133  
 
The commissioner who issued the arbitration award or any other commissioner 
appointed by the director of the Commission for that purpose may on his accord or, on 
application by any affected party rescind or vary an arbitration award or ruling that is 
irregular in that it was erroneously sought or erroneously made in the absence of any 
affected party, it is ambiguous or contain an obvious error or omission or it is granted 
as a result of a mistake common to the parties to the dispute.  134  
 
A final and binding arbitration award that has been certified by the Commission 
director as an arbitration award that has been issued by the Commission immediately 
acquires the status of judgments or orders of the Labour Court and represents final 
relief that may be enforced as if it were a judgment or order of the labour Court.135 
However, this does not mean that the arbitration award has actually become an order 
of the Court and that the Labour Court should be approached to rescind the 
Commission Director’s certification order before the defective arbitration award could 
be reviewed. It is the Commission and not the Labour Court that can rescind the 
                                                 
132 s138 (7)(a) of the LRA 66 1995. 
133 s138 (7) © of the LRA 66 1995. 
134 s144 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
135 ss142 (1) and (3) and 158(1) © of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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certification order because it is the one that issued it. 136 Failure by a party to the 
dispute to comply with a Commission arbitration award constitutes contempt of the 
Commission and such contempt of the Commission may be enforced by the 
Commission by referral to the Labour Court for contempt proceedings in the Labour 
Court.137
 
2.2.6  Pre-dismissal Arbitration. 
 
In terms of section 188A of the Labour Relations Act,138 an employer can, with the 
consent of the employee, request in a prescribed form the Commission, an accredited 
council or an accredited private agency to conduct a pre-dismissal arbitration, which 
takes the place of a disciplinary hearing that is normally conducted by the employer. 
The written consent of a highly paid employee 139 for a pre-dismissal arbitration 
exercise may be included and contained in the employee’s contract of employment 
because such highly paid employees are usually in a stronger bargaining position 
when concluding contracts of employment. In case of lowly paid employees 140  such 
employee’s written consent to the carrying out of  a pre-dismissal arbitration cannot 
be incorporated into the employee’s contract of employment but must be obtained by 
the employer from the employee each time the employer intends to conduct a pre-
dismissal arbitration against the employee because such lowly paid employees are in a 
weak bargaining position when concluding contracts of employment and might be 
forced to agree to pre-dismissal arbitration against their will.  
 
 In a pre-dismissal arbitration, the pre-dismissal arbitrating commissioner decides 
whether the employee’s conduct or capacity contravenes a rule or standard of the 
workplace and if it does, whether it justifies dismissal or some other penalty. There is 
no opportunity for subsequent conciliation and arbitration and the only avenue to 
challenge the decision of the pre-dismissal arbitrator is review of the pre-dismissal 
arbitration award in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act. Parties tend to 
use pre-dismissal arbitration in sensitive cases only and the provisions of section 
                                                 
136 Tony Gois t/a Shakespeare’s Pub v Van Zyl 2003 11 BllR 1176 (LC). 
137 s142 (9) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
138 66 of 1995. 
139 A highly paid employee is an employee who earns more than R 89 455 per annum. 
140 Lowly paid employees are employees earning less than R89 455 per annum. 
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188A of the LRA which makes it possible for the Commission to conduct pre-
dismissal arbitrations on request, has not been widely used and has not added 
significantly to the Commissions ever increasing caseload.141
 
2.2.7   Adjudication by the Courts of Law 
 
Adjudication is a compulsory process by which a judge hears the parties’ respective 
arguments and examines their evidence and then determines the dispute between 
them. Adjudication of labour disputes in South Africa is done by the Labour Court, 
the Labour Appeal Court, the High Court and the Constitutional Court. The Labour 
Court may refuse to entertain a dispute if it is not satisfied that a prior attempt has 
been made to resolve it by conciliation, except those disputes which do not have to be 
first referred to conciliation such as applications for interdicts and other matters 
brought on notice of motion. A mandatory pre-trial conference of the parties to the 
dispute is held within 14 days of the filing of reply or the date on which it was to have 
been filed. 
 
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate labour disputes as a court of 
first instance where the Labour Relations Act142, the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act143 and the Employment Equity Act144 reserve such matters for it. The Labour 
Court judgments where it sits as a court of first instance are subject to appeal only to 
the Labour Appeal Court. 
 
The Labour Court as a supervisor of labour arbitration proceedings has also 
jurisdiction to review and set aside defective arbitration awards referred to it by any 
party to the dispute within six months and issued by commissioners of the 
Commission and private arbitrators of other labour dispute resolution bodies such as 
bargaining councils, statutory councils and accredited private agencies in terms of 
section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 145and section 33 of the Arbitration Act146 
                                                 
141 CCMA Annual Report 2002/2003  4. 
142 s157 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
143 s77 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
144 s50 of the EEA 75 of 1997. 
145 66 of 1995. 
146 42 of 1965. 
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respectively.147  Co-incidentally, the four listed grounds of review in terms of section 
145 of the Labour Relations Act 148 are the same as the four listed grounds of review 
in terms of section 33 of the Arbitration Act. 149 On receipt of the application for 
review by the Labour Court, the Labour Court may stay the enforcement of the 
arbitration award pending its decision.150 The Labour Court will review the final 
arbitration award if the ground for review is that the commissioner or private 
arbitrator committed misconduct, committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the 
arbitration proceedings, exceeded his powers or the award was improperly obtained 
by the successful party, for example, through fraud, bribe or other improper means. 
The Labour Court may also review and set aside defective arbitration awards and 
defective rulings of the Commission under its general power of review in terms of 
section 158(1) (g) of the Labour Relations Act 151 on the ground that the arbitrator 
who exercises public power/ who acts in a public administrative capacity committed a 
material error of law and the award is unreasonable, irrational and unjustifiable 
according to the reasons given for it.152 This is one of the grounds of review that are 
permissible in law like common law grounds of review. The Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act153 is applicable to the review of CCMA arbitration 
awards.154
 
The Labour Court is bound to review defective private arbitration awards conducted 
under the Arbitration Act155 if the dispute that was arbitrated in terms of the 
Arbitration Act 156 could have been referred for conciliation and arbitration or 
adjudication in terns of the Labour Relations Act. 157
 
                                                 
147 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Campanella NO 2004 1 BLLR 1 (LAC); Seardel 
Group trading Ltd v Andrews NO 2000 10 BLLR 1219 (LC). 
148 66 of 1995. 
149 42 of 1965. 
150 s145 (3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
151 66 of 1995. 
152 Shoprite Checkers Ltd v Ramdaw NO 2000 7 BLLR 835 (LC); Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
Association of SA in re: Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 3 BCLR 241 (CC).  
153 3 of 2000. 
154 Carehone Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 11 BLLR 1093  (LAC). 
155 42 of 1965. 
156 42 of 1965. 
157 66 of 1995; Portnet v Finnemore 1999 2  BLLR  151 (LC); Eskom v Hiemstra NO 1999 10  BLLR  
151  (LC). 
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Once an arbitration award has been made an order of the Court in terms of section 
158(1) © of the Labour Relations Act 158, the arbitration award may not be reviewed, 
unless the court order is rescinded or set aside on appeal. This is a lengthy process. 
The Labour Court is not entitled to entertain an application for review of defective 
arbitration awards while the arbitration awards remain an order of court. 159  The 
remedy/ final order  of the review  exercise  that may be given by the Labour Court 
based on the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties during the arbitration 
hearing as evidenced by the record  of the arbitration procedures may be a 
confirmation order of the original arbitration award and the dismissal of the 
application for review or the amendment of the arbitrator’s  original arbitration award 
or the setting aside of the  arbitration award and referral of the dispute back to the 
appropriate dispute resolution body for a rehearing and determination under dispute 
resolution procedures prescribed by the Labour Court as it is not the function of the 
Labour Court to make arbitration awards. 160  
 
However, instead of referring the dispute back to the dispute resolution body 161 that 
made the arbitration award to correct it, it may be fair in certain circumstances for the 
Labour Court to take the decision itself:  
 
If the record of the arbitration proceedings is not available, for example, it is mislaid 
by the dispute resolution by the dispute resolution body, the Labour Court cannot 
determine the review on the papers but may refer it back to the dispute resolution 
body to be reheard by a different commissioner/ arbitrator. 162
The review function of the Labour Court gives arbitrators draconian powers because 
their defective arbitration awards are not directly appealable to any higher body but 
are only subject to review by the Labour Court. 
 
There is a fine dividing line between matters over which the Labour Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction and those in respect of which it shares jurisdiction with the 
Supreme Court. The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all labour 
                                                 
158 66 of 1995. 
159 Dartprops Ltd v CCMA 1999 2  BLLR  137  (LC). 
160 s145 (4) (b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
161 The dispute resolution body may be the bargaining council, the statutory council, the accredited 
private agency or the Commission. 
162 Shoprite Checkers Ltd v CCMA 2002 7  BLLR  677 (LC). 
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disputes that the Labour Relations Act 163  or any other law prescribed prescribes that 
they should be determined by the Labour Court. For example, the Labour Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of fundamental labour rights entrenched in section 23 
of the Constitution to which the Labour Relations Act 164  does give effect. The High 
Court does not have concurrent jurisdiction to handle matters which have been 
expressly assigned to the Labour Court. On the other hand, the Labour Court has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court in respect of matters which have not 
been specifically assigned to the Labour Court such as any alleged violation of any 
fundamental rights conferred by chapter 2 of the Constitution to which the Labour 
Relations Act does not give effect, that is, where the High Court jurisdiction not 
excluded. Moreover, the Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme 
Court in respect of any dispute over the constitutionality of any executive or 
administrative act by the State in its capacity as an employer and over the application 
of any law for the administration of which the Minister of Labour is responsible.165
 
The Labour Court also has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court and the other 
civil courts such as magistrates’ courts over disputes arising from any matter 
concerning a contract of employment or the basic conditions of employment such as 
breach or repudiation or unlawful termination of the contract of employment and 
claims for contractual damages or claims for remedies for unlawful dismissal.166 The 
High Court also has concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour Court on the review of 
defective private arbitration awards in terms of the Arbitration Act 167 which were not 
required to be referred to arbitration in terms of the LRA.168
 
The Labour Court has no jurisdiction over disputes covered by a collective agreement 
including a council agreement and such disputes must be directed to the process 
designated in the agreement or failing which to the Commission. The jurisdiction of 
the Labour Court is ousted in favour of the dispute resolution procedure in the 
                                                 
163 66 of 1995. 
164 66 of 1995. 
165 157(2) of the LRA 66 0f 1995. Eskom Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 2001 22 ILJ 818 
(WLD). 
166 s77 of the BCEA 75 0f 1997; Louw v Acting Chairman of the Board of Directors of the North West 
Housing Corporation 2000 21 ILJ 482(B); Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2001 22 ILJ 2407 
(SCA). Eskom Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 2001 22 ILJ 618. 
167 42 of 1965. 
168 66 of 1995. 
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collective agreement that may prescribe voluntary arbitration instead of adjudication. 
The Labour Court also has no jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute erroneously referred 
to it which the LRA169 requires it to be arbitrated unless the parties agree to 
arbitration by the Labour Court.170 The Labour Court may stay the court proceedings 
and re-direct the dispute to arbitration or if the parties consent to arbitration by the 
Labour Court and it is expedient to do so, the Labour Court may acquire arbitration 
jurisdiction and then assume the role of arbitrator and arbitrate the dispute while 
sitting as an arbitrator and may only make any order that a commissioner or arbitrator 
would have been entitled to make.171
 
The Labour Court, on its own accord or at the request of any party to the dispute 
before it, may refer to the Labour Appeal Court to decide in terms of section 158(4) of 
the LRA172  any question of law that arises during the proceedings of the Labour 
Court, if such question of law is decisive for the proper adjudication of the dispute. 
Pending the decision of the Labour Appeal Court on the question of law reserved for 
it, the Labour Court may render an interim judgement or make an interim order. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court has final jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals against 
final judgments and orders of the Labour Court.173 The Labour Appeal Court also has 
jurisdiction to decide any question of law arising during the proceedings of the Labour 
Court and reserved for and referred to it by the Labour Court on its own accord or at 
the request of any party to the dispute before it.174 Leave to appeal to the Labour 
Appeal Court must be sought from the Labour Court within 21 days after the date on 
which leave to appeal, has been granted but if it is refused the aggrieved party may 
petition the Judge President of the Labour Appeal Court for relief, whose decision is 
final, subject only to review by the Constitutional Court. The Labour Court may 
endorse the appeal application if the applicant has reasonable prospect of success on 
appeal and there is the absence of potential irreparable harm being sustained by the 
applicant if appeal is granted or being sustained by the respondent if appeal is refused. 
The notice of Appeal must specify which parts of the judgment a quo are being 
                                                 
169 66 of 1995. 
170 ss157 (5) and 158(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
171 s158 (2) and (3) of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
172 66 of 1995. 
173 s166 (1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
174 ss158 (4) and 173(1)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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appealed against. A late application for leave to appeal must be accompanied by an 
application for condonation. A refusal by the Labour Court of condonation for late 
application for leave to appeal is appealable to the Labour Appeal Court for relief. 
 
Judgments of the Labour Appeal Court are binding on the Labour Court and 
arbitrators even if the Labour Court or the arbitrator is of the view that the decision of 
the Labour Appeal Court is plainly wrong except where the higher court had not 
referred to statutes or rules that would necessarily have led to a different 
conclusion.175
 
In terms of the Constitution there lies a further appeal against the decision, judgement 
or order of the Labour Appeal Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal. If the matter 
concerns a constitutional issue the final appeal is to the constitutional court.  A 
decision, to which any two of the three judges constituting the Labour Appeal Court 
agree, is the final decision of the Labour Appeal Court. 
An appeal from the Labour Court, Labour Appeal Court or the Supreme Court on a 
constitutional matter goes to the Constitutional Court.176 The Constitutional Court 
made it clear in these two cases cited in the above note that it will entertain appeals 
from the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court where the interpretation of 
labour legislation by such courts is restrictive and affects the constitutional right to 
fair labour practices and the appellants seek to rely on independent constitutional 
rights. For example, in the Baderbop case it was restrictively and erroneously held 
that minority unions may not strike in support of demands for the grant of 
organisational rights reserved in the Labour Relations Act 177 for majority unions. The 
Constitutional Court corrected this decision by holding that minority unions have a 
statutory right to use strike action to support their demand for the grant of 
organisational rights. 
 
On receipt and hearing of an appeal, the Labour Appeal Court may confirm, amend or 
set aside the judgment or order which gave rise to the appeal and give any relevant 
                                                 
175 Bargaining Council for the Clothing Industry (Natal) v Confederation of Employers of Southern 
Africa   1998 19 ILJ 1458 (LC). 
176 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC); NUMSA v Baderbop 2003 24 ILJ 305 
(CC). 
177 66 of 1995. 
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judgment or order.178 It can also make an order for the payment of costs by a party to 
the dispute, according to the requirements of law and fairness. He Judge President of 
the Labour Appeal Court may direct that any matter which is before the Labour Court 
be heard by the Labour Appeal Court sitting as a court of first instance in which case 
the Labour Appeal Court is entitled to make any order that the Labour Court would 
have been entitled to make.179 There is no appeal to the Labour Appeal Court against 
any judgment/ order made in terms of sections 175 and 183 (c) of the Labour 
Relations Act.180
 
The judgements and orders of the Labour Appeal Court create binding precedent on 
the Labour Court, the Commission, bargaining councils, statutory councils and 
accredited private agencies.   
 
2.3.   The Present Non-Statutory System 
 
Self-regulation 181 is the primary non-statutory mechanism for regulating and 
resolving disputes in collective bargaining. Employers, trade unions and employees 
are encouraged to regulate and resolve their own disputes through collective 
bargaining. Registered trade unions and employer organisations must ensure that all 
collective agreements contain their own, agreed and preferred private dispute 
resolution procedures such as private conciliation, private mediation, private fact-
finding, private non-binding advisory arbitration and private arbitration for resolving 
disputes about the interpretation and application of collective agreements and other 
disputes. The agreed private dispute resolution procedures will then replace the 
corresponding procedures in the Labour Relations Act.182  
 
If a collective bargaining agreement or private agreement designates arbitration by a 
non-statutory dispute resolution private agency, the Arbitration Act183 will apply.184  
                                                 
178 s 174(2) (b) of the LRA of 1995. 
179 s 175.of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
180 66 of 1995. 
181 Self-regulation refers to a situation where parties agree to use their own non-statutory and private 
labour dispute resolution procedures and bodies 
182 66 of 1995; s24 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
183 42 of 1965. 
184 s 157 (3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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The Arbitration Act 185  does not apply to statutory dispute resolution agencies such as 
the Commission. Where the Arbitration Act 186 or the arbitration agreement is silent, 
common law applies. In relation to the non-statutory private dispute resolution 
institutions and individuals, the Commission has only residual jurisdiction.187      
 
Private conciliation is a voluntary process. The chosen private conciliator to assist the 
parties in finding a mutually acceptable solution to their dispute is agreed by all the 
parties to the dispute. Private conciliation is similar to statutory conciliation except 
that every party to the dispute must agree to and participate in the selection of the 
conciliator. 
 
Private arbitration is governed by the Arbitration Act. 188 Where the arbitration 
agreement or the Arbitration Act189  is silent, the common law applies. Any labour 
dispute, whether it is a dispute of right or of interest, may be referred to private 
arbitration by written agreement of the parties even if the Labour Court, the 
Commission, an accredited council or an accredited private agency has jurisdiction 
over that dispute.190  This means that non-statutory private arbitration remains an 
option, as an alternative to statutory arbitration or to adjudication. 
 
Arbitration under the auspices of bargaining councils, statutory councils or accredited 
private agencies could proceed either in terms of the LRA191 or in terms of a private 
arbitration agreement supplemented by the Arbitration Act192
 
Private arbitrators are able to arbitrate both disputes of interest and disputes of right 
because they derive their jurisdiction from an agreement193 and not from external law.  
Parties may also elect to waive their right to litigate and accept the arbitrator’s award 
on question of law or fact.194
                                                 
185 42 of 1965. 
186 42 of 1965. 
187 s 24(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
188 42 of 1965. 
189 42 of 1965. 
190 s 157(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
191 66 of 1995. 
192 42 of 1965. 
193 The contract sets out their terms of reference and powers. 
194 ss 2 and 3 of the arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
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Like private conciliation, private arbitration is a voluntary, private and confidential 
process. Unless otherwise agreed no one who is not directly involved in the case is 
entitled to attend the proceedings.195 Usually, only the parties, their representatives (if 
agreed to) and witnesses attend. Legal practitioners are usually not allowed to 
represent parties, unless the parties agree. Unlike in statutory arbitration where the 
continuation of arbitration is compulsory unless the referring party withdraws or 
abandons the dispute, the continuation of private arbitration is compulsory unless all 
the parties agree to terminate. 
 
A private arbitration award must be issued within a time limit agreed by the parties, 
which is usually 14 days. Unlike an arbitration award by the Commission which is 
public, a private arbitration award is confidential, unless the parties agree to its 
publication. A private arbitration award is final and binding subject to review in terms 
of section 33 of the Arbitration Act.196 The award can be made an order of court by 
any party by applying to the Labour Court or any other court of competent jurisdiction 
in terms of section 33 of the Arbitration Act.197
 
The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review private arbitration 
proceedings198 conducted in terms of the Arbitration Act. The grounds of review in 
section 33 of the Arbitration Act are the same as and similarly-worded as, those under 
section 145 of the Labour Relations Act.199 These grounds of review are namely, 
misconduct by the private arbitrator; gross irregularity committed by the private 
arbitrator; private arbitrator exceeded his powers; and an award has been improperly 
obtained. Private arbitration awards are usually not appealable, unless parties agreed 
that they would have a right to appeal.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
195 s15 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
196 42 of 1965. 
197 42 of 1965. 
198 s 157(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
199 66 of 1995. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM IN SWAZILAND 
 
3.1.  History and Background 
 
The Industrial Relations Act 200 was the first labour legislation in Swaziland to 
establish and promote collective bargaining and dispute resolution machinery, to 
establish the first Industrial Court of Swaziland which began operations in 1983 and 
whose main purpose was to further, secure and maintain good industrial relations in 
Swaziland 201 and to promote the establishment of joint industrial councils and works 
councils that were to perform both collective bargaining and dispute resolution 
functions. This labour legislation was drafted by the Government of Swaziland in the 
early 1980s response to the country-wide occurrence of illegal strikes in 1976. 
  
The banning of and the prohibition of the formation of political parties in Swaziland 
in 1973 by King Sobhuza II through the promulgation of the notorious 1973 Decree 
caused the banned political parties to actively support trade unions. Trade unions 
became very powerful and they militant they started to demand a living wage. An 
illegal strike wave developed countrywide. In 1976 the illegal strikers became riotous 
in the whole of Swaziland. These riots were even joined by school children and 
students countrywide. In and attempt to institutionalize labour conflict the Industrial 
Relations Act was accordingly promulgated.   
 
Before the establishment of the Industrial Court in Swaziland, labour disputes were 
adjudicated by High Court. 
 
                                                 
200 4 of 1980. 
201 s4 of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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In terms of the Industrial Relations Act 202 a dispute may be reported to the Labour 
Commissioner in writing only by 
i. An employer; 
ii. An industry union or a staff association; 
iii. A member of a joint industrial council; 
iv. an unrecognised active organisation in the undertaking in the absence of a 
recognised organisation; or  
v. An employee in the undertaking.203  
 
Every party reporting a dispute was to sign the written report/ form of the dispute and 
immediately deliver by hand or send by registered post a copy of such report to the 
other party or parties to the dispute. A dispute could not be reported to the Labour 
Commissioner if more than 6 months had elapsed since the issue giving rise to the 
dispute first arose. However, the Labour Commissioner could, where he considered it 
just and equitable and with the written approval of the Minister for Labour, extend the 
6-month period during which a dispute could be reported.204  
 
On receipt of a reported dispute the Labour Commissioner or his representative 
officer could: 
i. Request further particulars about the dispute and the parties to the dispute. The 
dispute was treated as effectively reported only on the date on which such 
particulars were supplied to the Labour Commissioner; or  
ii. Refer the dispute back to the parties for the dispute settlement procedures 
agreed between the parties as contained in a collective agreement to be 
followed if they had not been followed. The dispute was deemed to have been 
effectively first reported to the Labour Commissioner only on the date when 
the parties or either of them reported that the dispute still existed.205  
 
Alternatively, either party to the dispute could apply to the Industrial Court for a final 
and binding determination thereof, if the dispute raised questions as to the nature206 of 
                                                 
202 4 of 1980. 
203 s50 of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
204 s50(3) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
205 s52 (1), (3) and (4) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
206  The nature of the dispute refers to whether the dispute is a dispute of right or of interest. 
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the dispute. The dispute was deemed to have first been reported to the Labour 
Commissioner on the date when the decision of the Court on the question was given; 
 
Once a dispute was reported or was deemed to have been reported to the Labour 
Commissioner in terms of the Industrial Relations Act,207 and the exchange of 
documents by and between the parties did not settle the dispute the Labour 
Commissioner was required to arrange a conciliation meeting of the employer and the 
employee and then conciliate the dispute within 14 days or such extended period 
agreed upon by the parties to the dispute in writing. 
 
The officer handling208 the dispute played a neutral and advisory role during 
conciliation with a view to inducing the parties to reach an agreement voluntarily but 
also to advise them of the type of agreement which would be unacceptable, for 
instance if they agreed to contract out of the applicable law . A series of conciliation 
meetings could be convened over one matter. Witnesses could be called to give 
evidence. Conciliation was undertaken in a hierarchical fashion. If a Labour Inspector 
could not successfully conciliate on any matter, he referred the complaint to the 
Senior Labour Inspector who, in turn, referred the matter to the Labour Officer in the 
event of an unsuccessful conciliation. If the Labour Officer failed he could refer it to 
the Senior Labour Officer. If the matter failed at the level of Senior Labour Officer, it 
was regarded as an unresolved dispute and referred to the Industrial Court for 
adjudication. 
 
A tripartite Labour Conciliation Council was formed by the Labour Department in 
August 1984 to further conciliate unresolved disputes pending their referral to the 
Industrial Court for adjudication. This occurred in cases where the Labour 
Commissioner could not secure settlement under section 54 of the Industrial Relations 
Act.209 This tripartite conciliation council consisted of a total of 6 members, two from 
each of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions210, Federation of Swaziland 
Employers211 and the Department of Labour.  
                                                 
207 4 of 1980. 
208 The officer handling the dispute handles the dispute on behalf of the Labour Commissioner. 
209 4 of 1980. 
210 The Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions is abbreviated as SFTU. 
211 The Swaziland Federation of Employers is abbreviated as SFE. 
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In instances where a dispute was resolved either before or after conciliation, the 
parties to the dispute prepared a memorandum of agreement setting out the terms 
upon which the agreement was reached. Each party could present the memorandum to 
the Labour Commissioner with a request that it be forwarded to the Industrial Court 
for registration so that is was made an order or award of the Court.212
 
A dispute that remained unresolved after the conciliation period had expired or before 
the conciliation period had expired but where the Labour Commissioner was satisfied 
that no useful purpose could be served by continuing to conciliate, was noted by the 
Labour Commissioner as an unresolved dispute within 21 days after the issuing of a 
certificate of unresolved dispute. The Labour Commissioner was required to state any 
reasons, which in his opinion had prevented a settlement.213
 
Disputes of right in non-essential and non-maintenance services as well as both 
disputes of right and of interest in essential and maintenance services that remained 
unresolved after conciliation were referred to the Court for adjudication, by the 
Labour Commissioner on his own accord, on the request by both parties. If the dispute 
that remained unresolved after conciliation was a dispute of interest in non-essential 
or non-maintenance services either or both of the parties could give a 14-day strike or 
lockout notice to the other party and to the Labour Commissioner.214 Either party 
wishing to go on strike or institute a lockout could take such industrial action after the 
expiration of 14 days and before the expiration of 21 days from the date on which the 
Ministry of Labour ought to have or had actually declared the dispute to be an 
unresolved dispute and the parties thereto had been served with a certificate of an 
unresolved dispute.215  
 
If the Minister for Labour considered that the national interest was threatened by a 
legal strike or legal lockout or by an illegal strike or illegal lockout, he could apply to 
the Industrial Court ex parte for an injunction restraining the parties from 
commencing or from continuing the strike or lockout action in national interest. The 
                                                 
212 s57 (1) and (2) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
213 s58 (1) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
214 s58 (2), (3) and (4); s59 (1) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
215 Mndzebele, Dlaminini and Fakudze 1984 University of Swaziland Serminar: 16 March  5. 
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Court could make such order thereof as it considered fit having regard to the national 
interest. If the Court gave an order in favour of the application by the Minister for 
Labour, the parties were bound by that order to immediately refrain from or 
discontinue such industrial action and the dispute giving rise to such industrial action 
was deemed to have been referred to the Court by the parties concerned for 
adjudication.216  
 
The Industrial Relations Act217 criminalised non-compliance with the statutory strike 
or lockout procedure. An employer, an employee, an official or an organisation upon 
conviction for failure to comply with the procedure was liable to a maximum fine of 1 
000 Emalangeni 218 or in default of payment thereof to imprisonment for a maximum 
period of one year or to both fine and imprisonment. In the case of an organisation, 
the Court could also cancel or suspend the certificate of registration while in the case 
of a holder of an office in an organisation, the Court could disqualify him from 
holding office in any organisation for a period of 5 years after conviction therefor.219
 
When conciliation failed to resolve a rights or an interest dispute in an essential or 
maintenance service dispute between employers and employees including disputes 
about the formation of industry unions, works councils, staff associations and 
employers’ associations, the Department of Labour arbitrated the unresolved dispute. 
 
After conciliation failed or if settlement was not forthcoming and after the 
complainant or the other party or both parties to the dispute had indicated that they 
wished to proceed to the Industrial Court, the Ministry of Labour prepared a docket 
containing an application to the Industrial Court together with the essential pre-
requisite documentation such as a ministerial conciliation report, a certificate of 
unresolved dispute. This docket was handed over to the Registrar of the Industrial 
Court to take action in accordance with the Industrial Court Rules as to distribution, 
assigning Court case numbers and fixing dates of first appearance in Court.220  
 
                                                 
216 s63 of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
217 4 of 1980. 
218 1ooo Emalangeni are equal to 1 ooo Rands. 
219 ss62 and 65 (3) (4) and (5) (a) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
220 Mndzebele, Dlamini and Fakudze 1984 University of Swaziland Seminar: 16 March 7. 
 49
The Industrial Court had exclusive jurisdiction in every labour dispute or grievance 
brought to it where legislation gave it such powers.  Where legislation did not give the 
Industrial Court exclusive jurisdiction, the Industrial Court had concurrent jurisdiction 
with the High Court. The Industrial Court also had the power to remit a matter to the 
parties, or to the parties and the Labour Commissioner with such directions or advice 
as it deemed appropriate for further negotiation and conciliation with a view to 
reaching settlement.221
 
Upon remittance of the dispute to the parties, the Ministry of Labour could play a 
conciliatory role between the parties, unless the parties refused the services of the 
ministry. If this court-ordered reconciliation failed to resolve the dispute, the Ministry 
of Labour prepared and submitted to the Industrial Court and to the other parties its 
fresh ministerial conciliation report.222  
 
The Industrial Court was not bound by the rules of evidence or procedure which 
applied in civil proceedings and could disregard any technical irregularity which did 
not or was not likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.223 Any question of law as to 
whether a matter for decision that arose at a sitting of the Industrial Court was a 
matter of law or fact was to be decided by the President of the Industrial Court. 
 
The decision of the Industrial Court President’s as to whether any question was a 
question of law or of fact was appealable to the High Court and from there to the 
Court of Appeal. However, the Industrial Court’s decision (not the President’s 
decision) was not appealable to any other Court. However, the decision of the 
Industrial Court was reviewable by the High Court at the request of any interested 
party on grounds permissible at common law.224  
 
An employee could be represented in the industrial Court by any person authorised by 
him including a legal practitioner except a labour Department official or representing 
himself. An employer party could be represented by an employee, a director, an 
official from the employer organisation or a legal practitioner. The common source of 
                                                 
221 s6 (1) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
222 Mndzebele, Dlamini and Fakudze 1984 University of Swaziland Seminar: 16 March  8. 
223 s16 of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
224 s5 (4) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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representation came from the Federation of Swaziland Employers (for employers), the 
Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (for employees) and the legal practice (for 
either employers or employees or both).225
 
In 1996 the Industrial Relations Amendment Act226  which was the first amendment 
to the IRA and introduced the following major changes: 
i. It established the first Industrial Court of Appeal that had power to hear and 
determine, within 3 months, any appeals from the Industrial Court.227 After 
hearing an appeal, the Industrial Court of Appeal could confirm, amend or set 
aside the decision or order against which the appeal was noted and make any other 
decision or order. The decision of the majority of judges hearing an appeal was the 
final decision of the Court; 
ii. It reviewed and increased fines for non-compliance with the strike or lockout 
procedure from a maximum of 1 000 Emalangeni to a maximum of 5 000 
Emalangeni and the period of imprisonment was increased from a maximum 
period of one year to a maximum period of two years or deregistration of the 
organisation or banning of the official from holding office for a period of 5 years. 
228  
iii. It introduced the concept of resolving labour disputes through conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration but did not establish an independent institution to give 
effect to the processes. The Department of Labour performed the conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration functions during this period. 229  
The Industrial Relations Amendment Act230 was the second Amendment Act 
introduced the major changes: 
It established the Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission231 (hereinafter 
“the Commission”) whose main functions were to conciliate a dispute referred to it 
and where a dispute referred to it remained unresolved after conciliation, to arbitrate 
the dispute;232 The establishment of the Commission represented a major shift in 
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226 143 of 1996. 
227 s17 (1) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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labour dispute resolution by shifting the primary responsibility for the resolution of 
labour disputes from the State to an independent body. 
The Amendment Act also decriminalised non-con-compliance with the strike or 
lockout procedure and removed the payment of fines, imprisonment, deregistration of 
organisations and the banning of officials from holding office in any organisation for 
a period of 5 years upon conviction. The removal of these clauses was effected after 
the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions and the Swaziland Federation of Labour 233 
reported this practice to the Conference of the International Labour Organisation in 
Geneva. A delegation of experts from Geneva visited Swaziland to carry out 
investigations. 
 
These criminalised provisions were replaced by sections 88 and 89, which required 
the aggrieved party to apply to the Industrial Court for an interdict or order restraining 
any person from participating in an illegal strike or lockout and for the payment of 
just and equitable compensation for any loss attributable to the illegal strike or illegal. 
When determining equitable compensation the following factors were to be 
considered: 
i. the duration of the strike or lockout; 
ii. the financial position of the employer, trade union, staff association or 
employee; 
iii. the interest of orderly collective bargaining; 
iv. whether there was compliance with the Court’s interdict or order; 
v. whether the strike or lockout was in response to unjustified conduct by the 
other party to the dispute; 
vi. whether the strike or lockout was premeditated; and 
vii. whether attempts were made to comply with the strike or lockout procedure 
and the extent of those attempts; 
Finally the Amendment Act gave the Labour Commissioner power to grant an 
extension of time upon application by a reporting party on disputes reported after 6 
months but before 36 months since the issue giving rise to the dispute first arose.234   
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In 2005, further recommendations were introduced by the Industrial Relations 
Amendment Act.235 It introduced the following major changes:  
Labour disputes can now be reported directly to the Commission instead of being 
reported indirectly to the Commission via the Labour Commissioner; 236  
The Amendment Act also introduced court-ordered compulsory arbitration to be 
conducted by the Commission. The President of the Industrial Court is granted 
discretionary powers to re-direct disputes to the Commission and give a directive to 
the Commission that any dispute correctly referred to the Industrial Court in terms of 
any Act be determined by arbitration under the auspices of the Commission;237 The 
decision of the Industrial Court or of an arbitrator appointed by the Commission 
following a directive by the president of the Industrial Court, on a question of law is 
appealable to the Industrial Court of Appeal; 238
In addition the Amendment Act increased the period within which a dispute may be 
reported to the Commission from six months to eighteen months and eliminated any 
possibility of applying for condonation for late referral of a dispute to the 
Commission.239
 
3.2.   The Present Statutory System 
 
3.2.1. Direct Reporting of Labour Disputes to the Commission 
 
In terms of the Industrial Relations Act 240 a dispute may only be reported directly 241 
to the Commission and no longer indirectly to he Commission via the Commissioner 
of Labour on the prescribed referral form obtainable from the Commission offices and 
its website. No other form of report is permitted by the Commission. According to the 
Commission’s customary rules the dispute must be reported to and handled in the 
Commission office situated in the region where the dispute first arose.  
                                                 
235 Of 2005. 
236 s 76(1) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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The correct person to report a dispute directly to the Commission is an employer, an 
employers’ organisation, an employee, an employees’ organisation, a member of a 
joint industrial council, a works council, or an applicant for employment in respect of 
a dispute concerning unfair discrimination under the Employment Act. 242  
 
A dispute must be reported to the Commission   within 18 months since the issue 
giving rise to the dispute arose.243 There is no provision for the application of late 
condonation. 
 
Upon receipt of the dispute report, the Commission may: 
i. request further particulars of any of the matters on the referral form and the 
dispute is treated as effectively reported only on the date on which the further 
particulars are supplied;244 
ii. refer the dispute back to the parties if suitable dispute settlement procedures 
exist between the parties as may be found either in a joint industrial council 
constitution, a collective agreement, a works council constitution or otherwise 
but have not been reasonably followed in an attempt to settle the dispute, so 
that those procedures are followed.245 The dispute referred back to the parties 
by the Commission is deemed to be reported to the Commission on the date 
that either party reports that the dispute still exists provided the Commission is 
satisfied that all reasonable steps have now been taken to comply with such 
suitable procedures as may exist;246 
iii. reject the report of the dispute if it is frivolous, vexatious or time wasting. Any 
party not satisfied with the decision of the Commission may appeal to the 
Industrial Court;247 or  
iv. wait if either party make an application to the Industrial Court for the 
determination thereof if there is any question as to the nature of the dispute 
that has been reported to the Commission.248 
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A party reporting a dispute must immediately deliver by hand or send by registered 
post a copy of the report of the dispute to the other party or parties to the dispute.  The 
report of the dispute must then be lodged with the Commission together with proof 
that it has been served on the other party or parties to the dispute. The Commission 
retains the original report of the dispute for purposes of conciliation, mediation, and 
arbitration or for any other recognised dispute settlement process.249 The Commission 
is not required to investigate the dispute after receiving it but it does manually screen 
the dispute to establish jurisdiction. 
  
3.2.2.   Statutory Conciliation by the Commission 
 
On receipt of a reported dispute, the Commission must appoint a commissioner who is 
best suited to resolve the particular dispute at hand within four days. The dispute must 
be resolved within 21 days or such extended period agreed by the parties, through 
conciliation which includes mediation, non-binding fact-finding and the making of 
recommendations in the form of an advisory arbitration award. If the dispute is a 
dispute in an essential service, the conciliating commissioner must attempt to resolve 
the dispute within 7 days or some other extended conciliation period agreed between 
the parties.  
If the dispute is resolved by agreement between the parties either before 
conciliation250 or after conciliation, the parties, with the assistance of the 
commissioner, prepare a memorandum of agreement setting out the terms upon which 
the agreement was reached and lodge the memorandum with the Commission which 
in turn lodges it with the Industrial Court. Upon registration at the Industrial Court, 
the memorandum has the same force and effect as a registered collective 
agreement.251  
 
                                                                                                                                            
248 s79 (1) and (2) of the IRA of 2005.The Court must decide whether the dispute is a dispute of right or 
of interest. 
249 s77 (4) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
250 Before conciliation refers to the period during the exchange of documents by the parties during the 
dispute reporting period. 
251 s84 of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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At the end of the 21-day conciliation period or any further conciliation period agreed 
between the parties, the conciliating commissioner issues a certificate of non-
resolution if conciliation has failed to resolve the dispute and serves a copy of that 
certificate on the Commissioner of Labour and on each party to the dispute. The 
original certificate is filed with the Commission.  The conciliating commissioner who 
issued a certificate of non-resolution retains jurisdiction over the dispute until the 
dispute is settled. Should the dispute need to be arbitrated he will act as an 
arbitrator.252
 
Any party to an unresolved dispute after conciliation may take lawful action in terms 
of section 86 of the Industrial Relations Act253  by way of a strike or lockout if:  
i. the dispute has been certified as an unresolved dispute; 
ii. the dispute has not been referred to arbitration; 
iii. the parties to the dispute are not engaged in an essential service; and 
iv. the strike or lockout procedure has been followed.  
 
In the case of a strike, a first written strike notice is given to the employer, the 
employers’ association, the Commissioner of Labour and the Commission before the 
strike ballot; a second written strike notice is given to the employer, the employers’ 
association, the Commissioner of Labour and the Commission at least 48 hours before 
the commencement of the strike but after the strike ballot, provided the majority of the 
employees have voted in favour of the strike. In the case of a lockout at least 2 days 
written lockout notice must be given before the commencement of the lockout 
provided that a lockout is not affected earlier than 21 days after the date on which the 
dispute has been certified as unresolved. 
 
If the Minister for Enterprise and Employment considers that any actual or threatened 
legal strike or lockout threatens national interest, he may make an application to 
Industrial Court for an injunction restraining the parties from commencing or 
continuing with such a strike or lockout. The parties are bound by the court order and 
must immediately discontinue such strike or lockout and the interest dispute, giving 
rise to the strike or lockout is deemed to have been referred to the Industrial Court by 
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the parties concerned for adjudication.254 This amounts to adjudication of an interest 
dispute in non-essential services.  
 
3.2.3.   Intervention in Conciliation by the Commissioner of Labour  
 
If the Commissioner of Labour is satisfied that an existing or threatening dispute255 
may have serious implications for employers, employees or the economy if not 
resolved or prevented quickly, he must advise the parties in writing of his intention to 
intervene before the dispute is referred to the Commission. The Labour Commissioner 
may himself attempt to resolve or prevent the dispute by conciliation or appoint, after 
consultation with the Commission, a commissioner to attempt to resolve or prevent 
the dispute through conciliation. If the Commissioner of Labour finishes his 
conciliatory exercise but fails to resolve the dispute, the Commission may deem the 
dispute to have been conciliated and the Commission may then issue, serve and file a 
certificate of non-resolution in terms of section 81(5) of the IRA.256   
 
In terms of section 75(2) of the IRA 257 conciliation is a private and confidential 
process. Any information, knowledge or document acquired during conciliation must 
not be disclosed to any person or any Court except on an order of any Court. Because 
of the privacy and confidentiality of conciliation proceedings, legal practitioners and 
other non-parties are not allowed, unless the parties agree to such representation. In 
conciliation proceedings a party to the dispute may appear in person or be represented 
only by a co-employee(s) or by a member(s), an office bearer(s) or official(s) of that 
party’s organisation and if the party is a juristic person by a director(s) or employee(s) 
of that juristic person. 258 This means that plural representation is permitted in 
conciliation in Swaziland. 
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conciliation in terms of 82(1) of the IRA of 2005, the word “dispute” has a broader meaning. The word 
dispute includes an existing or a looming dispute between employees and employers; between trade 
unions and employers or their organisations; between trade unions and trade unions, and between 
employer organisations and employer organisations. 
256 Of 2005; s82 (7) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
257 of 2005. 
258 s81(4) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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The Commission is now empowered to deal with defaulting parties according to 
whether the reported dispute is a dispute of right or a dispute of interest. If a party 
fails to attend conciliation and the dispute is a dispute of right, the commissioner may: 
i. reject the report of the dispute if the party that fails to attend the conciliation 
meeting is the one who reported the dispute, 259 or 
ii. automatically refer the dispute to arbitration, if the party who fails to attend 
the conciliation meeting is the respondent or is not the person who reported the 
dispute. The arbitrator may grant default judgement against that party after 
hearing the arguments, evidence or defence and the relief sought by the party 
in attendance.260 However, provision is made for the rescission of such award 
where there is a reasonable cause for non-attendance.261  
 
On the contrary, if one party fails to attend the conciliation meeting and the dispute is 
a dispute of interest, the commissioner may at the request of the party in attendance 
do one of the following:  
i. issue a certificate of unresolved dispute or 
ii. extend the 21-day conciliation period or such other agreed extended 
conciliation period for up to a further 21 days. 262 
 
If a dispute is resolved after conciliation, the commissioner must assist the parties 
prepare a memorandum of agreement. However, if a dispute remains unresolved after 
conciliation and the dispute is a dispute of right the parties may refer the dispute to the 
Industrial Court for determination.  However, the President of the Industrial Court is 
given statutory power/ jurisdiction to decide whether the dispute correctly referred to 
the Industrial Court, should be adjudicated by the Industrial Court or should be re-
directed to the Commission without the consent of the parties to the dispute so that the 
Commission can arbitrate the dispute. If in his view the dispute must be arbitrated by 
the Commission, he may re-direct/ refer the dispute to the Commission with a 
directive for the appointment of an arbitrator by the Commission to arbitrate the 
dispute.  
 
                                                 
259 s81(7) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
260 s81(7) (b) and (c) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
261 s17(6) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
262 s81(8) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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The re-direction of disputes from the Industrial Court to the Commission is a measure 
to minimise the backlog of cases at the Industrial Court and significantly increased the 
workload for the Commission in almost all its processes. 263 The re-direction of cases 
by the Industrial Court will diminish continued over-reliance by parties on the formal 
court litigation process. Many parties to disputes, especially employers, are however 
still reluctant to refer disputes to arbitration. A significant number of unresolved 
disputes continue to be referred to the Industrial Court mainly by employer parties 
causing a further increase of the existing backlog. The jurisdiction of the Labour 
Court to re-direct disputes received will result in a significant rise in the number of 
disputes that get finally referred to arbitration and will, in the long-run, change the 
mindset prevailing in some quarters of the business community that the Commission 
favours employees when rendering arbitration awards. Swaziland has a very low 
average dispute referral rate to arbitration of about 10% compared to the average 
dispute referral rate to arbitration of over 65% experienced by sister Commissions 
within the Southern African Development Community264 region.265
 
3.2.4.   Statutory Arbitration by the Commission 
  
Where a dispute referred to the Commission remains unresolved after conciliation, the 
Commissioner who conciliated the dispute has arbitration jurisdiction over the dispute 
and must arbitrate the dispute if: 
i. the dispute is a dispute of interest and of right in essential services and any 
party to the dispute as referred the dispute to arbitration by the Commission. 
This is compulsory arbitration; 266 
ii. the IRA permits arbitration of such a dispute and both parties to the dispute 
have agreed that the dispute be resolved through arbitration. 267 This is 
voluntary arbitration; 
                                                 
263 CMAC Annual Report 2005 5. 
264 The Southern African Development Community is abbreviated as SADC. 
265 CMAC Annual Report 2002/2003 12. 
266 s96 (3) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
267 s64 (1) © (ii) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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iii. the parties to the dispute in respect of which the Industrial Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction consent to arbitration under the auspices of the Commission.268 
This is voluntary arbitration.  
iv. the President of the Industrial Court has given a directive to the Commission 
that an ad judicable dispute correctly referred to the Industrial Court for 
adjudication be determined by arbitration under the auspices of the 
Commission269 This is court-ordered compulsory arbitration; 
v. the President of the Industrial Court upon receipt of an application to decide 
whether an application should be handled by the Court or the Commission has 
decided that the dispute be handled by the Commission.270  
 
The arbitrator must conduct the arbitration in a manner that the arbitrator considers 
appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly. Expert and non-expert 
witnesses may be called to give evidence. An arbitrator has all the remedial powers of 
the Industrial Court. He may thus order re-instatement, re-engagement or 
compensation in terms of section 16 of the IRA. He must give signed and brief 
reasons for the final arbitration award within 30 days of the end of the arbitration 
hearing.271
 
The arbitrator who has made an arbitration award may vary or rescind the award if: 
i. it was erroneously made in the absence of any party affected by the arbitration 
award; 
ii. it is ambiguous or contains an obvious error or omission or it was made as a 
result of a mistake common to the parties to the proceedings.272 
 
Like conciliation, arbitration is a private and confidential process in terms of section 
75(2) of the IRA. Arbitrators must not disclose to any person or in any Court any 
information, knowledge or document acquired in the course of arbitration except on 
an order of any Court. In arbitration proceedings a party to a dispute may appear in 
                                                 
268 ss64 (1) (c) (iii) and 85 (2), (3) and (4) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
269 s8 (8) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
270 s85 (1) (a) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
271 ss17 (1), ((3) and (5) and 85 (4) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
272 s17 (6) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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person or be represented by a legal practitioner or person(s) authorised by the party.273  
Hence, plural representation is allowed in arbitration proceedings by sections 17(4) 
and 81(4) of the IRA.  
 
3.2.5.   Adjudication by the Labour Courts and the High Court 
 
The Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any dispute 
covered by the IRA the Employment Act274 and the Workmen’s Compensation Act 
275 or any other legislation which extends jurisdiction to the Court or in respect of any 
matter which may arise at common law between an employer and an employee, or 
between an employer or employers’ association on the one hand and a trade union or 
staff association on the other hand, or between an employers’ association, a trade 
union, a staff association, a federation on the one hand and a member thereof on the 
other hand.276
 
The Industrial Court has all the powers of the High Court and any decision or order by 
the Industrial Court has the same force and effect as a judgment or order of the High 
Court. Hence, no appeal from the Industrial Court lies to the High Court. 
 
The Industrial Court has power to remit matters to parties with such direction and 
advice, as it may deem appropriate, where in the Industrial Court’s opinion the dispute 
is not clearly defined to allow it to be heard and determined. 
 
The Industrial Court has remedial powers to order re-instatement, re-employment, 
compensation or a fine to be paid in full or part to the person, organisation or 
federation that suffered monetary loss as a result of the breach that led to the fine.277
 
Industrial Court proceedings are public and any party may represent himself or be 
represented by a legal practitioner or any other person authorised by such party. 
                                                 
273 s17 (4) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
274 5 of 1980. 
275 7 of 1983. 
276 s8 (1) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
277 ss16 and 15 of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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The Industrial Court of Appeal has the same powers and functions as the Supreme 
Court. The Industrial Court of Appeal only hears and determines appeals from the 
Industrial Court on a question of law and reviews, defective decisions or orders of the 
High Court under sections 19(5) and 20(1) of the IRA. Hence, the judgments and 
orders of the Industrial Court of Appeal are not appealable to the Supreme Court. The 
decision of the Industrial Court or of an arbitrator appointed by the Commission 
following a directive by the President of the Industrial Court in terms of section 8(8) 
of the IRA, is appealable on a question of law to the Industrial Court of Appeal within 
3 months of the date of the decision. Like the Industrial Court and the Commission, 
the Industrial Court of Appeal is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence or 
procedure, which apply in civil proceedings.278
 
After hearing an appeal, the Industrial court of Appeal may confirm, amend or set 
aside the decision or order against which the appeal has been noted or make any other 
decision or order including an order as to costs according to law and fairness. The 
decision of the majority of the judges hearing an appeal is the decision of he Industrial 
Court of Appeal and such decision is final.279  
 
A decision or order of the Industrial Court or arbitrator is, at the request of any 
interested party, subject to review by the High Court on grounds permissible at 
common law.280 The High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Industrial Court 
where the IRA  or any other Act does not give the Industrial Court exclusive 
jurisdiction.  
 
3.3.   The Present Non-statutory System 
 
3.3.1.   Dispute Resolution Procedures embodied in Collective 
Agreements 
 
                                                 
278 s19 (1), (2) and (3) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
279 s21 (3) and (4) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
280 s19 (5) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
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Section 55 of the IRA requires a collective agreement  
(i) to contain effective non-statutory procedures for the avoidance and settlement of 
disputes within the industry and individual undertakings covered by the collective 
agreement; 
(ii) to contain provision for the settlement of all differences arising out of the 
interpretation, application and administration of the collective agreement. 
 
A collective agreement may provide for private conciliation, private mediation, 
private non-binding fact-finding, private advisory arbitration and private arbitration if 
the parties to that collective agreement wish to do so. Any such non-statutory private 
dispute resolution procedures take precedence over and replace the corresponding 
statutory dispute resolution procedures. Non-statutory private conciliation is carried 
out by private individuals and private dispute resolution institutions. Nothing in the 
IRA prevents parties from ignoring non-statutory private conciliation and private 
arbitration and then following the statutory procedure which involves statutory 
conciliation, statutory mediation, statutory non-binding fact-finding, statutory 
advisory arbitration and arbitration by the Commission.281  
 
3.3.2.   Disputes affecting Diplomats accredited to Swaziland 
 
Disputes affecting diplomats accredited to Swaziland are handled by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, which contacts the diplomat involved. There is no direct 
dealing between diplomats on the one hand and the Ministry of Enterprise and 
Employment or the Commission on the other hand as per the observation of the 
Protocol Treaty. Any labour dispute involving a diplomat that happens to be reported 
directly to the Commission or the Ministry Enterprise and Employment is re-directed 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for resolution.282  
 
3.3.3.   Reporting Labour Disputes Direct to the King 
 
                                                 
281 s64 (1) (b) and (c) of the IRA 4 of 1980. 
282 Mndzebele, Dlamini and Fakudze 1984 University of Swaziland Seminar: 16 March  7. 
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Citizens of Swaziland including employees have a customary right to exercise 
pressure by reporting their dispute directly to the King at his principal royal 
palaces,283 if they are aggrieved. In Swazi Law and Custom this is referred to as 
“ukwembula ingubo eNkhosini”284. The King has both conciliatory and arbitral 
powers. The King meets the complainant(s) and then commands his traditional 
advisory body, the Liqoqo, to conciliate the dispute on his behalf and report the 
conciliation outcome to him. If conciliation fails, the Liqoqo arbitrates the dispute and 
reports the arbitration award to the King. It is the King himself or through 
representation who formally gives the conciliation settlement agreement or the 
arbitration award to the parties to the dispute. Alternatively, the King working on the 
advice of the Liqoqo may refer the dispute to specialist statutory or non-statutory 
labour dispute resolution institutions such as the Commission, the Industrial Court, the 
High Court and the Industrial Court of Appeal.  
 
However, where the aggrieved employee(s) cannot see the King to report their dispute 
directly to him because he is either in seclusion for the Incwala Sacred Ceremony, he 
is outside the country or he is otherwise occupied, the employees report their dispute 
directly to the Liqoqo through the King’s Office. The Liqoqo acts as a traditional 
court. The King’s commands are final and binding and no court of law or any other 
person may set them aside, because the King is above the law 285 and all the 
legislative,286 executive287  and judicial 288 powers in the country are either directly 
vested in him or are vested in him through representation.289  
 
Where direct access to the King is denied by the King’s Office, by the soldiers and 
police officers that guard the Royal Palaces or by any other person, the complainants 
must in order to gain access to see the King buy a gift for the King in the form of a 
cow or cattle and then apply for permission from the King’s Office to see the King in 
order to deliver the gift. This is the easiest traditional way to see the King and the 
King knows that most people who apply to see him to deliver gifts experience serious 
                                                 
283 The Kings principal royal palaces are, Luzdzidzini and Lozitha. 
284 This is translated into English as “running to the King for shelter/rescue”. 
285 s11 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland 73 of 2005. 
286 s106 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland 73 of 2005. 
287 s64 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland 73 of 2005. 
288 s138 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland 73 of 2005. 
289 ss11, 64, 106 and 138 of the Constitution of Swaziland 73 of 2005. 
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problems that they wish to inform him about so that he can resolve these problems. 
When delivering the gift directly to the King, the complainant(s) can then take 
advantage of the opportunity and relate the dispute to the King who will not refuse to 
entertain it.  
 
During February 2005, there was a dispute between the Swaziland Agricultural and 
Plantations Workers Union and the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation pending in 
the Industrial Court. The dispute involved the retrenchment of 700 employees. The 
affected union members reported the dispute to the Liqoqo which agreed to hear the 
matter and then summoned the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation management to 
Ludzidzini for a conciliation meeting. 
 
In 1996, the Swaziland National Association of Teachers 290 reported a labour dispute 
about a demand for an 18% pay rise, directly to the King at the Lozitha Royal Palace 
following a two-month long legal strike that failed to resolve the dispute. The teachers 
came in their numbers and crammed Lozitha Royal Palace, following the 
Government’s threat to close down all schools in the country for the whole of the 
remaining part of the year, if the teachers did not abandon the strike and return to 
work unconditionally due to the substantial loss of teaching time. The King met the 
teachers in their numbers and promised to investigate their complaint. The King 
slaughtered 25 cattle on that particular eventful day to feed the teachers. After failure 
of the Liqoqo to resolve the interest dispute by conciliation, an arbitrator from South 
Africa was employed by the Swaziland Government to arbitrate the interest dispute. 
The arbitrator rendered an award in favour of the government. As a result of the 
intervention by the King, the strike was called off and the conflict was 
institutionalized by the process of conciliation and arbitration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
290 Swaziland National Association of Teachers is abbreviated as SNAT. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
COMPARISON291  BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAZILAND 
 
4.1. Statutory Conciliation Differences 
 
4.1.1. Statutory Conciliation-arbitration 
 
The Industrial Relations Act292 of Swaziland is silent on the process of con-arb while 
section 191(5A) of the Labour Relations Act293 of South Africa makes provision for a 
con-arb process in regard to dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes.  In terms of 
section 191(5A), con-arb is compulsory in all dismissal or unfair labour practice 
disputes relating to probationary employees and no party may object to con-arb in 
such cases. This means that failure of conciliation must be followed by arbitration 
immediately once a certificate of non-resolution has been issued by the conciliating 
commissioner. 
 
Conciliation-arbitration is voluntary in all other dismissal or unfair labour practice 
disputes not involving probationary employees and any party may object to con-arb 
by delivering a written objection to the Commission and the other party at least 7 days 
prior to the date of the con-arb.294 By objecting to conciliation-arbitration the other 
party is simply saying the matter must be referred to arbitration at a later date and not 
immediately. In the absence of any objection to con-arb, a failure of conciliation is 
followed by immediate arbitration by the same commissioner. In the year 2002/2003, 
2 512 con-arb were concluded.295  
 
The con-arb process was introduced by the amendments to the Labour Relations 
Act296 promulgated in August 2002 in an attempt to expedite the dispute resolution 
process by making conciliation and arbitration to take place as a continuous process 
on the same day. This expedited procedure is accordingly not available in Swaziland. 
                                                 
291 The word “comparison” in this context refers to both differences and similarities.  
292 Of 2005. 
293 66 of 1995. 
294 CCMA rule 17(2). 
295 CCMA Annual Report 2002/2003  8. 
296 66 of 1995. 
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4.1.2. Intervention by the Commissioner of Labour in Statutory Conciliation 
 
The Labour Relations Act 297 of South Africa is silent on the intervention of the 
Department of Labour in statutory conciliation. Swaziland does have such a provision 
in the Industrial Relations Act. 298 If the Commissioner of Labour is satisfied that an 
existing or looming dispute may have serious implications for employers, employees 
or the economy if not resolved or prevented quickly, he must advise the parties in 
writing of his intention to intervene before the dispute is reported to the Commission. 
He must subsequently conciliate or prevent the dispute quickly.299  
 
The Commissioner of Labour may:  
(i).intervene personally and attempt to resolve or prevent the dispute himself through 
conciliation or 
(ii) appoint, after consultation with the Commission, any person as a commissioner to 
attempt to resolve or prevent the dispute through conciliation or 
(iii) appoint, after consultation with the Commission, any person as a commissioner 
or, after consultation with the President of the Industrial Court, a judge of the 
Industrial Court, to conduct a fact-finding exercise and make recommendations for the 
resolution or prevention of the dispute.300
 
If a party reports a dispute to the Commission after the Commissioner of Labour has 
completed his conciliation, the Commission may deem the dispute to have been 
conciliated and then issue, serve and file a certificate of non-resolution in terms of 
section 85(5).301  
 
For purposes of the intervention of the Commissioner of Labour, the word ‘dispute’ 
has a broader meaning. It includes an existing or looming dispute between employees 
and employers; between trade unions and employers or their organisations; between 
trade unions and trade unions; and between employer organisations and employer 
                                                 
297 66 of 1995. 
298 Of 2005. 
299 s82 (1) and (2) of the IRA of 2005. 
300 s82 (3) (b) (i) to (iii) of the IRA of 2005. 
301 s82 (7) of the IRA of 2005. 
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organisations.302 In South Africa such intervention in serious disputes may be 
undertaken by the CCMA. 
 
4.1.3. Statutory Conciliation Time-frame 
 
In South Africa, the commissioner appointed to conciliate the dispute must conciliate 
the dispute within 30 days of the date the Commission received the referral or within 
any further period agreed between the parties to the dispute. 303 If the parties to the 
dispute are engaged in an essential service, the parties may consent within seven days 
of the date of the Commission received the referral to the appointment of a 
commissioner by the Commission to conciliate the dispute.304  If the parties do not 
consent to the appointment of a commissioner by the Commission to conciliate, the 
Commission must as soon as possible appoint a commissioner to resolve the dispute 
by conciliation.305  
 
In Swaziland, a commissioner appointed to conciliate the dispute must conciliate the 
dispute within 21 days of the date of appointment of the commissioner or within any 
extended period agreed between the parties to the dispute.306  If the parties to the 
dispute are involved in an essential service, the appointed commissioner must 
conciliate the dispute within 7 days307 it is submitted that although an expedited 
process is require, 21 days is too short a period to arrange a conciliation meeting. 
 
4.2. Statutory Arbitration Differences 
 
4.2.1. Openness or Confidentiality of Arbitration Hearings 
 
Like conciliation, arbitration is a private and confidential process in Swaziland. 
Arbitrating commissioners must not disclose to any person or in any Court any 
                                                 
302 s82 (1) of the IRA of 2005. 
303 s135 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
304 s135 (6) (1) (I) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
305 s135 (6) (b) (i) of the LRA of 1995. 
306 s82 (2) of the IRA of 2005. 
307 s96 (2) of the IRA of 2005. 
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information, knowledge or document acquired in the course of performing their 
arbitral functions except on an order of any Court.308  
 
In South Africa arbitration hearings are open or public hearings. Although the Labour 
Relations Act 309 of South Africa is silent on whether arbitration proceedings are open 
to the public, section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa310 
provides that arbitration by the Commission is a public hearing because the 
Commission is a public body that is subject to the Constitution which provides that 
everyone has a constitutional right to have his dispute resolved by the application of 
the law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or other independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum. In terms of section 36 (the limitations clause) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 311 commissioner does not therefore have 
the power to exclude a person from the arbitration hearing, unless such exclusion is 
reasonable and justified.   
 
4.2.2. Re-direction of Disputes to Arbitration by the Labour Court  
 
In Swaziland section 8(8) of the Industrial Relations Act 312 grants the President of the 
Industrial Court statutory power to re-direct some dispute received by it to the 
Commission without the permission of the parties to the dispute, with a directive that 
any dispute correctly referred to the Industrial Court for adjudication and now re-
directed to the Commission be determined by arbitration under the auspices of the 
Commission. The Industrial Court President does not need to get the consent of the 
parties to the dispute in order to direct a judiciable dispute to the Commission for 
arbitration. This is court-ordered compulsory arbitration. 
 
The purpose of this provision is to decrease the backlog of cases in the Industrial 
Court as many employers in Swaziland prefer to refer their disputes to the Industrial 
Court rather than to the Commission which they accuse of favouring employees when 
giving arbitration awards. 
                                                 
308 s75 (2) of the IRA of 2005. 
309 66 of 1995. 
310 108 of 1996. 
311 108 of 1996. 
312 Of 2005. 
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The Labour Relations Act 313 of South Africa does not have a similar provision where 
a dispute may be referred to arbitration by the Labour Court without the consent of the 
parties to the dispute. This is called court-ordered compulsory arbitration. In South 
Africa, a judiciable dispute is only referred to arbitration by the written consent of the 
parties to the dispute.314  In the absence of the written consent by all the parties, the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute that is judiciable but 
must refer it to the Labour Court for adjudication. A similar provision in Swaziland 
where parties to a dispute in respect of which the Industrial Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction may consent to arbitration under the auspices of the Commission is given 
by sections 64(1)(c) and 85(2) and (3) of the Industrial Relations Act.315
 
4.2.3. Judicial Arbitration by the Court 
 
The Labour Court in South Africa may acquire jurisdiction to arbitrate rather than to 
adjudicate a dispute with the consent of the Labour Court and the parties to an 
arbitration agreement.316 The Labour Court acts as an arbitrator or an arbitration court 
and not as a court of law and only makes an order corresponding to the arbitration 
award that an arbitrator could have made. 
 
The Industrial Relations Act 317 of Swaziland has no provision that gives arbitral 
powers to the Industrial Court to arbitrate disputes rather than to adjudicate them. 
Instead, the President of the Industrial Court may give a directive to the Commission 
to appoint a commissioner to arbitrate a judiciable dispute referred by the Court to the 
Commission. Such a commissioner appointed following a directive by the President 
of the Industrial Court acquires a status that is equivalent to that of an Industrial Court 
judge. Thus, his decision like that of the Industrial Court is appealable on a question 
of law to the Industrial Court of Appeal within 3 months of the date of the decision.  
 
                                                 
313 66 of 1995. 
314 ss133 (2) (b) and 141(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
315 Of 2005. 
316 ss141 (5) (a) (ii) and 158(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
317 Of 2005. 
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4.2.4. Effective Date of an Arbitration award involving the State 
 
In South Africa if an arbitration award involving the State has financial implications 
for the state, it only binds the State after 14 days and not immediately. During these 
14 days or within 14 days of the beginning of the next session of Parliament, the 
award is presented to Parliament for discussion and approval because the power to 
appropriate State moneys is vested exclusively in Parliament. Parliament then has a 
further 14 days to confirm or reject the arbitration award. If Parliament rejects the 
arbitration award, the dispute must be referred back to the Commission for further 
conciliation. If the dispute still remains unresolved, the Commission must re-arbitrate 
it at the request of any of the parties. However, the State is bound by the second 
arbitration award, even if the arbitration award does not secure parliamentary 
approval. 
 
In Swaziland the position is different. Arbitration awards, whether they involve the 
State and have financial implications for the State or whether they involve other 
employers are final and binding immediately without any waiting period and without 
any need to be either approved or rejected by Parliament.  
 
4.2.5. Reversal from Arbitration to Conciliation 
 
In South Africa, if the parties consent, the arbitrating commissioner may suspend the 
arbitration proceedings and attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation so that 
the final settlement is a mutual settlement of both parties.318  This means that 
conciliation may still be attempted even after arbitration has commenced. In 2002/ 
2003, out of a total of 41 896 arbitrations conducted by the Commission of South 
Africa, 21% were settled by reverting to the conciliation process. 319  
 
The Industrial Relations Act 320 of Swaziland is silent on reversion from arbitration to 
conciliation during the course of arbitration. However, according to the current 
Executive Director of the Commission, Mr Siphephiso Dlamini, an arbitrating 
                                                 
318 s138 (3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
319 CCMA Annual Report 2002/2003 9. 
320 Of 2005. 
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commissioner can in the exercise of the discretion vested upon him, suspend 
arbitration proceedings and revert from arbitration back to conciliation during 
arbitration proceedings, if it happens that a matter takes a conciliatory format during 
arbitration and he decides to exercise the discretion vested in him in the best interest 
of parties to the dispute.  
 
4.2.6. Pre-dismissal Arbitration 
 
. Section 188A of the Labour Relations Act321 of South Africa, provides that an 
employer can, with the consent of the employee, request the Commission, a council or 
an accredited agency to conduct a pre-dismissal arbitration, which takes the place of a 
disciplinary hearing by finding out whether an employee’s conduct or capacity has 
failed to meet a set employment standard and if so, whether it justifies dismissal or a 
penalty short of dismissal. There is no opportunity for subsequent conciliation and 
arbitration if a party is dissatisfied with the pre-dismissal arbitration. The only 
available opportunity is review of the pre-dismissal arbitration award by the Labour 
Court in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act.322
The Industrial Relations Act 323 of Swaziland is silent on pre-dismissal arbitration. 
When responding to a questionnaire, the current Executive Director of the 
Commission of Swaziland, Mr Siphephiso Dlamini, confirmed that the Commission 
does not conduct pre-dismissal arbitration. 
 
4.2.7 Objection to the Appointment of the same Commissioner 
 
In South Africa, the Commission may appoint the same commissioner who attempted 
to resolve the dispute through conciliation as an arbitrating commissioner. 324 
However, either party may object to the same conciliating commissioner being 
appointed the arbitrating commissioner by filing his objection with the Commission 
and serving a copy of the objection on all the other parties to the dispute.325  When the 
Commission receives an objection it must automatically appoint another 
                                                 
321 66 of 1995. 
322 66 of 1995. 
323 Of 2005. 
324 s136 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
325 s136 (3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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commissioner to arbitrate the dispute.326 Furthermore, all the parties to the dispute 
may agree to request the Commission within 48 hours of the date of the certificate of 
non-resolution, to appoint either the same conciliating commissioner as an arbitrating 
commissioner or appoint another commissioner as an arbitrating commissioner, to 
reasonably take into account their stated written preference which contains a list of no 
more than five commissioners.327  
 
Any party to a dispute may apply to the director of the Commission to appoint a 
senior commissioner to arbitrate the dispute. The director of the Commission may 
grant the application by appointing a senior commissioner to arbitrate the dispute or 
may reject the application by confirming the appointment of the commissioner 
initially appointed, after having considered: 
(a) the submissions of the party making the application, any other party to the 
dispute and the commissioner who conciliated the dispute; 
(b) the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute 
(c) the complexity of the dispute; 
(d) whether there are conflicting arbitration awards in similar disputes that need to 
be corrected; and 
(e) the public interest. 328 
 
In Swaziland, section 81(6) of the Industrial Relations Act329 provides that 
notwithstanding the issue of a certificate that the dispute is not resolved, the 
commissioner appointed to conciliate the dispute in terms of section 81(1) of the 
Industrial relations Act 330 retains jurisdiction over the dispute until it is settled.  
This means that parties to a labour dispute do not have influence or control over 
the appointment of a conciliating or arbitrating commissioner and cannot object to 
the appointment of the same conciliating commissioner as an arbitrating 
commissioner. 
 
                                                 
326 s136 (4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
327 s136(5) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
328 s137 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
329 Of 2005. 
330 Of 2005. 
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Section 80(2) of the Industrial Relations Act331 provides that in appointing a 
commissioner, the Commission shall use its best endeavours to appoint a 
commissioner who is best suited to the particular dispute in hand. 
 
4.2.8. Statutory Arbitration Time-frame 
 
In South Africa there is no legislated time-frame within which arbitrating 
commissioners must complete their arbitration proceedings if parties are engaged 
in a non-essential service. Where the parties are engaged in an essential service, 
the arbitrating commissioner must complete the arbitration and issue and 
arbitration award with brief reasons signed by that commissioner, within 30 days 
of the date of the certificate of non-resolution or within a further period agreed 
between the parties to the dispute, by conciliation.332  
Section 138 (7)(a) and (8) of the Labour Relations Act333  provides that the 
arbitrating commissioner must issue a signed arbitration award with brief reasons 
within 14 days of the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings or within such 
extended period, extended by the director of the Commission on good cause 
shown. 
 
In Swaziland, section 85(4) (a) of the Industrial Relations Act334 provides that if a 
dispute is referred to arbitration, the arbitrator must issue an arbitration award 
within 30 days of the end of the arbitration hearing. Section 138 (7) (a) and (8) of 
the Labour Relations Act335   
 
4.3. Adjudication Differences 
 
4.3.1. Assessors   
 
In Swaziland, the Industrial Court is constituted before a judge and two members or 
assessors, one member nominated by the employees’ federations and the other 
                                                 
331 Of 2005. 
332 s139 (1) (a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
333 66 of 1995, 
334 Of 2005. 
335 66 of 1995, 
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member nominated by the employers’ federation. A judge alone may hear and decide 
on a matter before the Court if the parties to the dispute so agree.336
The nominated members are appointed by the President of the Industrial Court for a 
term of 3 years, from a panel of 6 names nominated by the employers’ federation and 
from a panel of 6 names nominated by employees’ federations. The nominees are 
people who possess special skills and knowledge in industrial relations matters.337
 
The employer of the nominated member or alternate member is required to permit 
such member during working hours to perform any of the duties and the Court may 
make such order as it deems necessary to ensure compliance with this requirement.338  
 
In South Africa, the Labour Court is constituted before a single judge.339 People who 
are not judges such as members or assessors are not allowed to assist a judge when 
carrying out his work. 
 
4.3.2. Review of Defective Arbitration Awards, Court Judgements and Orders 
 
In Swaziland, defective final arbitration awards made by arbitrators and defective 
judgements or orders of the Industrial Court are, at the request of any interested party, 
subject to review by the High Court, which is not a specialist labour court on grounds 
permissible at common law.340 Hence, the reliability of the review outcome is highly 
questionable. 
 
In South Africa, defective final arbitration awards issued by commissioners of the 
Commission and private arbitrators are reviewed by the Labour Court and not the 
Supreme Court in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 341and section 33 
of the Arbitration Act342 respectively. 
 
The grounds of review in South Africa are:  
                                                 
336 s6 (6) and (7) of the IRA of  2005. 
337 s6 (2)(c)(i) and (4) of the IRA of 2005. 
338 s6 (11) of the IRA of 2005. 
339 s152 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
340 s19(5) of the IRA of 2005. 
341 66 of 1995. 
342 42 of 1965. 
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(i). that the commissioner or private arbitrator committed misconduct; 
(ii) that the commissioner or private arbitrator committed a gross irregularity in the 
conduct of the arbitration proceedings; 
(iii) that the commissioner or private arbitrator exceeded his powers; 
(iv) that the arbitration award was improperly obtained by the successful party 
through fraud, misrepresentation, bribery or corruption;343
(v) that the commissioner or private arbitrator committed a material error of law and  
the award is unreasonable, irrational and unjustifiable.344  
 
4.3.3. The Constitutional Court 
 
In South Africa, any constitutional dispute which includes any issue involving the 
interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution is heard and finally 
determined by the Constitutional Court, which is the highest court in all constitutional 
matters.345  An appeal from the Labour Court or from the Labour Appeal Court on a 
constitutional matter goes to the Constitutional Court.346  The Supreme Court has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Constitutional Court on a matter that is not 
exclusively reserved for the Constitutional Court or another court of status similar to a 
Supreme Court. 347  
 
There is no constitutional court in Swaziland. It is the High Court that has jurisdiction 
to hear and determine any matter of a constitutional nature. 348 Appeals on 
judgements, decrees or orders of the High Court including appeals on constitutional 
questions of law lie with the Supreme Court which is the final court of appeal.349 
However, both the High Court, and the Supreme Court which has appellate 
jurisdiction are not specialist constitutional courts.  
 
 
                                                 
343 s145 of the LRA, 66 of 1995; s33 of the arbitration Act  42 of 1965. 
344 s158 (1) (g) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
345 s167 (3) and (7) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
346 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC); NUMSA v Baderbop 2003 24 ILJ 305 
(CC). 
347 s169 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  108 1996. 
348 s151 (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland 73 of 2005. 
349349 s147(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland 73 of 2005. 
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4.3.4. Statutory Adjudication Time-frame 
 
In South Africa, there is no legislated time limit within which the Labour Court may 
adjudicate a dispute. By the same token, there is no prescribed time-frame within 
which the Labour Appeal Court may hear and determine an appeal. The only 
legislated time-frame is for the noting of an appeal after the date on which leave to 
appeal was granted.  In terms of section 173(3) of the Labour Relations Act 350  an 
appeal must be noted within 21days after the date on which leave to appeal has been 
granted.  
 
Likewise, in Swaziland there is also no legislated time-frame within which the 
Industrial Court must adjudicate a labour dispute. However, the Industrial Court of 
Appeal must where possible, endeavour to determine an appeal made to it within 3 
months from the date on which the appeal was noted. 351 It is submitted that time 
forms should be determined in South Africa as well, since parties often have to wait 
for excessive periods before judgements of the Labour Court and Labour Appeal 
Court are handed down. 
 
4.4. Strike and lockout Differences 
 
4.4.1. Interdict of protected strikes and lockouts 
 
In South Africa a protected strike or lockout cannot be interdicted by the Court. The 
Labour Court only has exclusive jurisdiction to grant an interdict against illegal 
strikes and lockouts. People participating in or organising a protected strike are 
indemnified against civil action, including mandatory or prohibitory interdicts. The 
Labour Court cannot issue an order restraining a union from commencing a strike or 
compelling the strikers to desist from striking and to return to work, if they can prove 
that they have complied with the requirements of the LRA.352 In South Africa, a 
                                                 
350 66 of 1995. 
351 s21(2) of the IRA of 2005. 
352 s67(6) of the LRA, 66 of 1995. 
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protected strike only terminates either when the strikers' demand has been resolved by 
the employer or when the strikers return to work unconditionally.353  
 
In South Africa, employers confronted with protected strikes have an option in terms 
of the LRA 354 to overcome the protected strike by applying to the Essential Services 
Committee to be declared an essential service on an ad hoc basis. The granting of an 
essential service status to the employer renders the protected strikers unprotected. The 
employer can now apply to Court for a prohibitory interdict or could issue the strikers 
with an ultimatum to return to work or else face dismissal.355
 
In Swaziland the Industrial Court may interdict a protected primary strike or lockout if 
national interest is threatened. If the Minister for Enterprise and Employment 
considers that any actual or threatened strike or lockout threatens national interest, he 
may make an application to the Court for an injunction restraining the parties from 
commencing or from continuing with such a strike or lockout. The Court may make 
such order as it deems fit after hearing such an application and having regard to the 
national interest.356 It is apparent that the position in Swaziland allows for significant 
state intervention. The position in South Africa is to be preferred and made in line 
with the position of voluntarism supported by the ILO. 
 
The parties are bound by the court order and must immediately discontinue such strike 
or lockout and the interest dispute giving rise to the strike/ lockout is deemed to have 
been referred to the Court by the parties concerned, for determination.357 This is 
adjudication of an interest dispute. 
 
4.4.2. Strike or Lockout Ballot 
 
In South Africa, a strike ballot or lockout ballot is not required to protect a strike or 
lockout even if a ballot is prescribed by the union’s constitution or the employers’ 
association constitution. Failure by a trade union or an employers’ organisation to 
                                                 
353 Afrox Ltd v SACWU  1997 18 ILJ 406 (LC). 
354 66 of 1995. 
355 ss70 and 71 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
356 s89(1) of the IRA of 2005. 
357 s89(2) of the IRA of 2005. 
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hold a strike ballot or a lockout ballot in now irrelevant to the legality of and the 
statutory protection conferred upon, a strike or lockout.358
 
In Swaziland, the Commision is required to arrange and supervise a secret ballot 
within 7 days of receiving the initial strike notice or protest action to determine 
whether the majority of the employees are in favour of the strike or protest action. In 
the event of a tie in votes, the majority is deemed to have not been achieved.359 Where 
the ballot count show that only a minority of the membership consent to the strike/ 
protest action, the strike/ protest action fails. However, failure by the Commission to 
organize a secret strike ballot or to notify the result of a strike ballot does not make 
the lawful strike/ lawful protest action unprotected.360
 
4.4.3. Secondary/ Sympathy Strikes 
 
Sympathy strikes are illegal in Swaziland because the statutory definition of a strike 
does not include a secondary employer. This means that employees can only strike 
against their employer and not against other employers despite the formation of 
industry unions in the kingdom. Section 2(d) of the Industrial Relations Act 361 
defines a strike as a “ complete or partial stoppage of work or slow down of work 
carried out in concert by two or more employees or any other concerted action on 
their part designed to restrict their output of work against their employer, if such 
action is done with a view to inducing compliance with any demand or with a view to 
inducing the abandonment or modification of any demand concerned with the 
employer-employee relationship”  In 1984, Justice Ben Dunn ruled in a High Court 
case between Crooks Plantations and the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantations 
Workers Union that sympathy strikes are illegal in Swaziland. 362 Secondary picketing 
is also illegal in Swaziland because secondary strikes are unlawful. 
 
                                                 
358 s67(7) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
359 s86 (2) of the IRA of 2005. 
360 s86 (5) of the IRA of 2005. 
361 Of 2005. 
362 1984 (HC) unreported. 
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In South Africa, sympathy or secondary strikes are permissible by section 66 (1) of 
the 1995 Labour Relations Act. 363 However, sympathy strikers are protected only if: 
i. The primary strikers are also protected because they have complied with the 
pre-strike procedure; 
ii. The secondary employer has been given at least 7 days notice of the proposed 
secondary strike, and 
iii. The sympathy strike is reasonable in relation to the possible direct or indirect 
effect that the sympathy strike may have on the business of the primary 
employer.364  
 
4.5. General Differences 
 
4.5.1. Application for Condonation for late referral of a dispute 
 
The Industrial Relations Act 365of Swaziland, unlike its predecessors does not provide 
for the application for condonation for late referral of a dispute to conciliation, 
arbitration or adjudication. Section 76(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 366 only 
provides that a dispute may not be reported to the Commission if more than 18 
months have elapsed since the issue giving rise to the dispute first arose. Application 
for condonation for late referral of a dispute to the Commission is no longer available. 
The automatic period for filing cases/ disputes for automatic condonation was 
increased from 6 months to 18 months to allow parties ample time to file disputes 
with the Commission and thus removing all other forms of condonation in the 
process. 
 
In South Africa a signed application for condonation for the late referral of a dispute 
to conciliation, arbitration or adjudication must accompany the signed referral form 
where condonation is required367 otherwise the Commission will lack jurisdiction to 
conciliate or arbitrate the dispute and the Court will lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
                                                 
363 66 of 1995. 
364 s66 (2)(c) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
365 Of 2005. 
366 Of 2005. 
367 CCMA rule 9; CCMA rule18 (2) (c). 
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dispute. The application for condonation for late referral of a dispute must set out the 
grounds for seeking condonation which may include: 
(a) the reasons for and degree of lateness; 
(b) the referring party’s prospects of succeeding with the referral and obtaining the 
relief sought; 
(c) the prejudice to the other party; 
(d) public interest; 
(e) the seriousness or importance of the matter such as a discrimination dispute which 
is a sensitive issue; 
(f) the number of employees affected.368  
 
4.5.2. General versus General and Specific Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
The South African labour dispute resolution system of the Labour Relations Act 369 
combines general dispute resolution mechanisms characterised by central institutions 
and standard procedures, such as the Commission, the Labour Court, 370 the Labour 
Appeal Court 371 and the Constitutional Court, with specific dispute resolution 
mechanisms in different contexts which are characterised by flexibility and 
decentralised institutions and flexible tailor-made procedures such as accredited 
councils 372 and accredited private agencies. 373
 
Under specific dispute resolution system, disputes must be dealt with by specific 
processes and specific dispute resolution bodies. If the parties choose the wrong 
process or go to the wrong body, they may find that their efforts to resolve the dispute 
are delayed and frustrated. 374 It is imperative that under the specific labour dispute 
resolution system, parties choose the right process and the right forum in terms of the 
LRA. 375  
 
                                                 
368 CCMA rule 9. 
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370 s65 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
371 s167 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
372 ss45 and 27 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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374 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 41. 
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The Swaziland labour dispute resolution system is strictly a general dispute resolution 
system characterised by central dispute resolution institutions such as the Department 
of Labour, 376 the Commission, 377 the Industrial Court, 378 the Industrial Court of 
Appeal, 379the High Court and the Supreme Court. Hence, the Commission in 
Swaziland has primary conciliation and arbitration jurisdiction 
 
4.5.3. Qualifications,Skills, Competence and Capacity Building of Commissioners 
 
In South Africa mechanisms are in place to ensure the personnel of the Commission 
are well-qualified and have a sound knowledge of the legal framework within which 
they are functioning. The more highly qualified and experienced commissioners are 
designated as senior commissioners. The Commission in South Africa has streamlined 
the commissioner recruitment process in order to identify good commissioners who 
will raise the standard of service that the Commission provides. The Governing Body 
of the Commission has adopted a two-tier recruitment system in which prospective 
commissioners are required to undergo a rigorous selection and training programme. 
Commissioners are only appointed once they have demonstrated competence in all the 
core training modules. The core training modules include modules in substantive law, 
modules in managing dismissal disputes, modules in conciliation and modules in 
arbitration.380 In recent times the CCMA has adopted a evaluation of candidates and it 
is submitted that the knowledge and competence of commissions will accordingly 
improve. 
 
The Commission in South Africa has established an Education, Training and 
Development Department to develop its staff, educate the public on dispute resolution 
and industrial relations best practice. 381 Commissioners in South Africa like their 
sister counterparts in Swaziland are subject to a code of conduct/ ethics 382 and may 
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be removed as commissioners for misconduct, incapacity and any material violation 
of the code of conduct such as non-recusal when there is conflict of interest. 383
 
The Governing Body of the Commission in Swaziland recruits and selects as 
commissioners people who have experience in industrial relations or labour law. In 
building capacity, the Commission in Swaziland enrolled all its commissioners and 
case management officers to pursue the Post-graduate Diploma programme in Labour 
Law offered and co-facilitated jointly by three universities, the University of Cape 
Town, the University of Lesotho and the University of Namibia in order to ensure that 
the commissioners attain high competencies in the field of conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration. The commissioners from Swaziland joined more than 80 other 
commissioners from the other sister commissions in the region, thus allowing for 
effective cross-pollination of experiences and the establishment of a network for 
consistent contact and consultation.  All the participants from Swaziland passed the 
programme and graduated.384  
 
The Commission in Swaziland established and launched a library in November 2003 
through the ILO/SWISS project. The library came with a licence to access the Butter-
worth website packed with court judgements from South Africa’s labour courts, 
textbooks and journals on industrial relations, dispute resolution and labour laws. 385   
 
4.5.4. Labour versus Industrial 
 
The Labour dispute resolution system of South Africa uses the comprehensive 
adjective “labour” to describe an employment dispute as a labour dispute, to describe 
employment courts as the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court and to describe 
the key employment legislation as the Labour Relations Act386  
 
The labour dispute resolution system of Swaziland uses the restrictive adjective 
“industrial to describe an employment dispute as an industrial dispute, to describe the 
employment courts as the Industrial Court and the Industrial Court of Appeal and to 
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describe the key employment legislation as the Industrial Relations Act387 it is 
submitted that the term “industrial” is outdated and too narrow a concept and should 
be replaced with the term “labour”. 
 
4.5.5. Accessibility of the Statutory Labour Dispute Resolution Institutions 
 
The Commission in South Africa has at least twelve branches located in 
Johannesburg, 388 Port Elizabeth, East London, Bloemfontein, Durban, Polokwane, 
Witbank, Kimberly, Klerksdorp, Cape Town and Pretoria The Commission in South 
Africa has a first class case management information system and a website that link(s) 
all the branches. It also has a call centre which provides a national, multi-lingual, 
labour-legal information service to the public. 389
 
The seat of the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court is in Johannesburg, Cape 
Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth. The Labour Court may sit in as many separate 
courts as the available judges may allow. South Africa has several other labour 
dispute resolution bodies such as bargaining councils, statutory councils and 
accredited private agencies. 
 
In Swaziland the Commission has six branches located in Mbabane,390 Manzini, 
Siteki, Piggs Peak, Nhlangano and Simunye and they are linked by a case 
management information system, a website and a transport facility. The seat of the 
Industrial Court and the Industrial Court of Appeal is only in Mbabane and so too is 
the seat of High Court and the Supreme Court. 
 
4.5.6. Representation of Parties at Conciliation and Arbitration. 
 
Both in South Africa and Swaziland, legal representation is not allowed in 
conciliation proceedings.391 In South Africa and in arbitration proceedings a party 
may appear in person or be represented only by a legal practitioner, a director, an 
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389 CCMA Annual Report 2002/ 2003  5, 31. 
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391 s81(4) of the IRA of 2005. 
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employee, a member, an office-bearer, an official of that party’s registered 
organisation, an official of the Department of Labour. Consultants are excluded from 
the list; hence, they are not entitled to represent a party. 
 
If the dispute being arbitrated is about unfair dismissal on grounds of misconduct or 
capacity, the parties to the dispute are not entitled to legal representation during the 
arbitration proceedings, unless: 
(a) the commissioner and all the other parties consent; 
(b) the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a party to the dispute 
to deal with the dispute without legal representation, after considering the nature of 
the questions of law raised by the dispute, the complexity of the dispute, the public 
interest, and the comparative ability of the parties to deal with the arbitration of the 
dispute. 392    
 
In Swaziland a person may be represent himself in arbitration proceedings or be 
represented by a legal practitioner, a co-employee(s), a member(s), a official(s), 
director(s), employee(s) of that person’s registered organisation or any other person(s) 
authorised by such party. 393  In Swaziland, consultants are included under “any other 
person authorised by such party” as there is no relevant section that explicitly 
excludes consultants. When responding to a questionnaire, the current Executive 
Director of the Commission of Swaziland, Mr Siphephiso Dlamini, confirmed that 
consultants do represent parties at arbitration proceedings because arbitration and 
adjudication are more legal processes than conciliation. Hence, it becomes trite law to 
use outside representatives like consultants and lawyers in arbitration proceedings.   
 
The Industrial Relations Act394  has introduced plural representation in conciliation 
and arbitration. This means that more than one person can now represent a party in 
conciliation 395 and arbitration 396  proceedings. 
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4.5.7  Percentage Dispute Distribution Referrals by Issue, by Sector and by 
Region 
 
Figures 5 (a), 5 (b) and 5 (c) below show a comparison of the percentage dispute 
distribution referrals by region, by sector and by issue between the dispute resolutions 
systems of South Africa and Swaziland.  
 
In South Africa, unfair dismissal disputes continue to account for the largest 
percentage of dispute referrals. In 2002/ 2003 these disputes accounted for 82% of the 
total caseload.  
The retail sector has consistently accounted for the highest number of referrals since 
the inception of the Commission in South Africa followed by the private security and 
the domestic sectors. The Gauteng Provincial Office has the largest caseload, 
followed by KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape.397             
                                                                          
In Swaziland, like in South Africa, unfair dismissal disputes continue to dominate and 
in 2005 accounted for 65% of the total caseload followed by unpaid wages at 15%. 
The retail sector continues to dominate, accounting for 24% followed by 
manufacturing with 13%. In 2005, the Hhohho region received 46% and Manzini 
maintained its second position and gained 39%. 398   
 
4.5.8. Background and History of Statutory Dispute Resolution 
 
South Africa has a long history of segregatory statutory labour dispute resolution 
which dates back to the early nineteenth century, when the Transvaal Disputes 
Prevention Act 399 was promulgated which applied only to the Transvaal. The 
statutory labour dispute resolution system of South Africa is now, at least, 97 years 
old. Before 1979, the year in which the Wiehahn Recommendations were 
implemented, the statutory labour dispute resolution system of South Africa excluded 
black workers because the statutory definition of employee excluded black workers. 
This exclusion of black workers from the official statutory collective bargaining and 
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dispute resolution system of South Africa resulted in a dual system of industrial 
relations as black workers tirelessly continued to mobilize themselves into stronger 
unrecognised black trade unions despite the existence of statutory roadblocks of the 
Apartheid regime. 
 
The labour dispute resolution system of South Africa as a long history of statutory 
racial segregation and this has exacerbated adversarialism in labour relations in South 
Africa. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa400 and the Employment 
Equity Act 401 are legislative initiatives taken by the democratic Parliament to correct 
the imbalances in employment settings caused by the Apartheid regime, for example, 
by implementing affirmative action measures which are legally entrenched as a form 
of fair discrimination. 402  
 
The statutory labour dispute resolution system of Swaziland has a short history that 
dates back to 1980, when the first Industrial Relations Act 403 and the first 
Employment Act404 were promulgated. The statutory labour dispute resolution system 
of Swaziland now, at least, 26 years old.  Non-compliance with the statutory strike or 
lockout procedure was criminalised in 1980 by sections 62 and 65(3), (4) and (5) (a) 
of the Industrial Relations Act.405 In 2000, section 76(4) and (5) of the Industrial 
Relations Act 406  decriminalised non-compliance with the strike or lockout procedure 
following pressure from the International Labour Organisation.  
 
4.6. Non-Statutory Differences 
 
4.6.1. Reporting of Labour Disputes Direct to the Head of State 
 
South Africa does not have a non-statutory dispute resolution mechanism by which 
labour disputes may be reported directly to the President of the country or the Head of 
State. In Swaziland some complainants endeavour to exercise pressure by 
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complaining directly to the King for conciliation and arbitration. Upon meeting the 
complainants the King commands his advisory body, the Liqoqo to conciliate the 
dispute and if conciliation fails, the Liqoqo advises the King as to whether the King 
should arbitrate the dispute himself or get an outside arbitrator or refer the dispute to 
Court for adjudication. The King’s decision is final and binding and is a royal 
command and no Court of law or other person may have the power to challenge the 
King’s decision or command because the King is above the law in terms of section 11 
of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland 407and all the executive, legislative 
and judicial powers are exclusively vested in him in terms of sections 64, 106 and 140 
of the same Constitution. 408
 
According to Swazi Law and Custom “the King is Umlomo longacali manga” 
because he always gives royal commands after receiving advice.409  Whatever 
command he gives is deemed to be correct, final and binding.  
Should the King after recieving advice command that the dispute be referred to Court 
for adjudication, the Commission must use the facts of the informal conciliation by 
the Liqoqo to prepare a conciliation report for the Industrial Court and the 
complainant is asked to formalise the report of his dispute in a written form for the 
Industrial Court.410   
 
4.6.2.  Labour Disputes Affecting Diplomats 
 
The Commission does not have jurisdiction to conciliate and arbitrate labour disputes 
affecting diplomats accredited to Swaziland. Disputes affecting Diplomats accredited 
to Swaziland are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade which contacts 
the Diplomat involved. Only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has jurisdiction to hear 
such labour disputes. There is no direct dealing between Diplomats on the one hand 
and the Commission or the Ministry of Enterprise and Employment on the other hand 
as per the observation of the Protocol Treaty. Any Labour dispute involving a 
Diplomat that happens to be erroneously reported to the Commission or the Ministry 
                                                 
407 73 of 2005. 
408 73 of 2005. 
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410 Mndzebele, Dlamini and Fakudze 1984 University of Swaziland Seminar: 16 March  5. 
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of Enterprise and Employment is channelled to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade for resolution.411  
 
South Africa does not have a similar arrangement. All disputes are reported to the 
Commission, bargaining councils, statutory councils, or accredited agencies. There 
are no labour disputes that are handled by the Ministry of foreign affairs in South 
Africa.  
 
4.7.   Statutory Conciliation Similarities 
 
 4.7.1. Use of Conciliation as the Primary Dispute Resolution Method 
 
Both dispute resolution systems start off the process of dispute resolution with 
conciliation, which may include other consensus-seeking processes such as mediation, 
non-binding fact-finding and advisory arbitration, by a council with jurisdiction or by 
the Commission if no council has jurisdiction as the first step in labour dispute 
resolution before the dispute is subjected to industrial action, arbitration or court 
adjudication if it remains unresolved after conciliation. Councils have primary 
jurisdiction in their areas of registered scope while the Commission has residual 
jurisdiction. However, in Swaziland, the Commission has primary jurisdiction there 
are no known examples of registered joint negotiation councils as required by section 
45 of the Industrial Relations Act412 that must have both collective bargaining and 
dispute resolution functions in their areas of registered scope.  
 
Both dispute resolution systems recognise and use conciliation which is a consensus-
seeking process as the primary and pivotal dispute resolution method and only if 
conciliation fails, may the parties resort to other processes. Thus, all disputes must be 
conciliated before they can proceed to arbitration or before strike or lockout action 
could be taken subject to certain exceptions. On the other hand, most disputes must be 
conciliated before adjudication by the Labour or Industrial Court. In both dispute 
resolution systems, the conciliator must conduct the conciliation in a manner that he 
considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly.  
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The systems of labour dispute resolution are structured upon the key concepts of 
conciliation, arbitration, court adjudication and strike/ lockout. 413 If conciliation fails 
to resolve the dispute both systems move to the next logical step which is either, strike 
or lockout action, arbitration or adjudication by the Labour or Industrial Court. If the 
unresolved dispute is a dispute of interest in non-essential or non-maintenance 
services, any party may take lawful action by way of a strike or lockout provided the 
strike or lockout procedure has been followed except where the law waives 
compliance with the procedure and the dispute has not been referred to arbitration or 
adjudication. If the dispute is a dispute of interest or of right between parties engaged 
in essential or maintenance services or is a dispute of right between parties that are not 
engaged in essential or maintenance services, the dispute must be arbitrated by 
council or the Commission or must be adjudicated by the Labour or Industrial Court 
as labour legislation may prescribe.  
 
4.8. Similarities in Statutory Arbitration 
 
4.8.1. Review of Defective Arbitration Awards 
 
Once again, both dispute resolution systems make provision for the review of 
defective arbitration awards issued by arbitrating commissioners of the Commission 
and private arbitrators. In Swaziland the review of defective final arbitration awards is 
done by the High Court on grounds permissible at common law in terms of section 
19(5) of the Industrial Relations Act. 414 In South Africa, the review of defective final 
arbitration awards is done by the Labour Court in terms of sections 145 and 158(1)(g) 
of the Labour Relations Act, 415 if the ground for review is that the arbitrator 
committed misconduct, the arbitrator committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of 
the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator exceeded his powers, the arbitration award 
was improperly obtained by the successful party or the arbitrator committed a material 
error of law and the arbitration award is unreasonable, irrational and unjustifiable.  
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4.8.2. Flexibility of Arbitration Proceedings 
 
Both under the South African and the Swaziland jurisprudence, the arbitrating 
commissioner may conduct the arbitration in a manner that the commissioner 
considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly but must 
deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal formalities. 
The commissioner has wide latitude of discretion to exercise concerning the manner 
he handles the arbitration proceedings. 416  
 
4.8.3. Variation and Rescission of Arbitration Awards 
 
Both in South Africa and in Swaziland, the arbitrating commissioner who has issued 
an arbitration award , acting on his own accord or on the application of any affected 
party, may vary or rescind the arbitration award if: 
(a) It was erroneously sought or erroneously made in the absence of any party affected 
by the arbitration award; 
(b) It is ambiguous or contains an obvious error or omission; 
(c) It was made as a result of a mistake common to the parties to the arbitration 
proceedings. 417   
 
4.8.4. The use of Statutory Arbitration as an Alternative to Court Adjudication 
 
Sections 133(2) (b) and 141(1) of the Labour Relations Act418 of South Africa 
provides that if a dispute remains unresolved after conciliation, the Commission must 
appoint a commissioner to arbitrate the dispute if all the parties to the dispute in 
respect of which the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate have 
consented in writing to statutory arbitration under the auspices of the Commission, as 
an alternative to court adjudication. However, in the absence of the written consent of 
all the parties to the dispute, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute 
that the Labour Relations Act419 or some other Act requires the dispute to be 
                                                 
416 s138 (1) of the LRA 66 of 1995; s17 (3) of the IRA of 2005. 
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adjudicated by the Labour Court and must refer the dispute to the Labour Court for 
adjudication.  
 
In Swaziland the Industrial Relations Act420 provides that if a dispute remains 
unresolved after conciliation, the Commission must appoint a commissioner to 
arbitrate the dispute if the parties to the dispute in respect of which the Industrial 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction consent to statutory arbitration under the auspices of 
the Commission. Furthermore, section 8(8) of the Industrial Relations Act421 of 
Swaziland grants the President of the Industrial Court power to re-direct some 
disputes received by the Industrial Court to the Commission without the consent of 
the parties to the dispute and give a directive to Commission that an ad judicable 
dispute correctly referred to the Labour Court for adjudication be determined by 
statutory arbitration under the auspices of the Commission. This is called court-
ordered statutory arbitration. 
 
4.9. Statutory Adjudication Similarities 
 
4.9.1. Appeals 
 
Both the dispute resolution systems of South Africa and Swaziland make provision 
for appeals. In Swaziland, the Industrial Court of Appeal which has the same powers 
and functions as the Supreme Court previously known as the Court of Appeal, only 
hears and determines appeals from the Industrial Court and reviews from the High 
Court under sections 19(5) and 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act. 422 There is no 
constitutional court in Swaziland. In terms of section 151(2)(b) of the Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Swaziland, the High Court of Swaziland has jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any matter of a constitutional nature. In terms of section 147(1) of the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland423 appeals on judgements, decrees or 
orders of the High Court or on cases involving a substantial question of law such as a 
constitutional question of law lie with the Supreme Court which is the final court of 
appeal.  
                                                 
420 Of 2005. 
421 Of 2005. 
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 92
 
In South Africa, the Labour Appeal Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine 
appeals against the final judgements and orders of the Labour Court in terms of 
section 166 (1) of the Labour Relations Act.424 The Labour Appeal Court also has 
jurisdiction to decide any decisive question of law arising in the proceedings of the 
Labour Court and reserved for it by the Labour Court on its own accord or at the 
request of any party.  
 
In South Africa, an appeal from the Labour Appeal Court on a constitutional matter 
goes to the Constitutional Court. This means that the Labour Appeal Court is not the 
final court of appeal in constitutional matters. Thus, in NUMSA v Bader Bop425, the 
Constitutional Court overruled the decision of the Labour Appeal Court and held that, 
despite the fact that the Labour Relations Act 426 does not confer organisational rights 
upon unrepresentative unions, there is nothing in the same Act that prevents an 
unrepresentative union from using collective bargaining and strike to induce the 
employer to grant it organisational rights.  
 
4.9.2. Exclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction 
 
The Labour Court of South Africa and the Industrial Court of Swaziland have 
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate labour disputes where legislation reserves such 
matters for them. The Labour Court and the Industrial Court also have concurrent 
jurisdiction with Supreme Court and the High Court respectively in matters not 
reserved for the Labour Court or Industrial Court by legislation.  
 
4.10. General Similarities 
 
4.10.1. Self-Regulation 
 
Both labour dispute resolution systems of South Africa and Swaziland recognise and 
promote self-regulation by making statutory provision that registered trade unions, 
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registered employers’ organisations, employers and employees must ensure that all 
collective agreements, contain the parties’ preferred private procedures and private 
institutions which may be different from the ones prescribed in legislation for the 
prevention and settlement of disputes within the individual undertakings and industry 
covered by the collective agreement and also contain procedures for the settlement of 
all disputes arising out of the interpretation, application and administration of the 
collective agreement. These preferred private dispute resolution procedures may 
include collective bargaining, private conciliation, private arbitration, strike or 
lockout.  
 
The agreed private dispute resolution procedures incorporated in collective 
agreements take precedence over and replace the corresponding statutory dispute 
resolution procedures in the labour legislation. Section 24 of the Labour Relations 
Act427 and section 55(1) (b) and (d) of the Industrial Relations Act428 specifically 
requires parties to collective agreements to regulate how disputes in terms of those 
agreements are to be resolved. Parties can always agree to use processes and bodies of 
their choice. 
 
4.10.2. Promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes  
 
Both the Commissions of South Africa and Swaziland are working tirelessly to ensure 
that their clients are sensitized of the need to use the alternative route to resolve 
disputes and thus make the Commissions the preferred dispute resolution institutions. 
Even the labour statutes of these two countries promote alternative dispute resolution 
processes provided by the Commissions and other sister alternative dispute resolution 
institutions such as conciliation, mediation, conciliation-arbitration, non-binding fact-
finding, advisory arbitration and arbitration.  For example, section 8 (8) of the 
Industrial Relations Act429 of Swaziland is a legislative initiative by which the 
Swaziland government attempts to change the mindset of employers towards 
arbitration and thus promote arbitration.  
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Alternative dispute resolution processes have advantages of confidentiality, speed, 
reduced cost, informality, courtesy, finality (no right of appeal) and equitability of 
awards. Litigation/ adjudication is discouraged because it is too costly, time-
consuming due to inherent court delays, technical, formal, inflexible and, adversarial. 
430   
 
4.10.3. Networking 
 
Both the Commissions of South Africa and Swaziland have forged good working 
relationships with other sister labour dispute resolution institutions around the globe. 
The internationally recognised and custom-designed case management information 
system of the Commission of South Africa is a popular feature for visiting 
international delegations The Commission of Swaziland has forged good working 
relationships with the Commission of South Africa, the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration, the Commission of Australia, the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, and the Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Resolution in 
Lesotho for the sharing of experiences and challenges in structure, operations and 
programmes so that it becomes a world-class institution modelled against best 
standards in the labour dispute resolution industry. A number of visits have been 
made to these Commissions. 431  
 
4.10.4. Part-Time Commissioners 
 
Both the South African and the Swaziland labour dispute resolution systems make 
gainful use of part-time commissioners. 432 Part-time commissioners need not leave 
lucrative private practices, academic life or private consulting undertakings to take up 
full-time employment with the Commission but can make their own time for placing 
their considerable experience at the disposal of the dispute resolution system at times 
and places that suit them. 433  
 
4.10.5. Conciliation, Arbitration, Court Adjudication and Strike/ Lockout 
                                                 
430 Trollip Alternative Dispute Resolution (2005)  24 – 25. 
431 CMAC Annual Report 2004  9; CMAC Annual Report 2005  8. 
432 ss117 (2) (a) and 66(2) (a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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The Labour dispute resolution systems of South Africa and Swaziland are structured 
upon the key concepts of conciliation, arbitration, court adjudication and strike/ 
lockout. In both labour dispute resolution systems conciliation which is a consensus-
seeking process is a generic term that includes other consensus-seeking processes 
such as mediation, non-binding fact-finding and advisory arbitration and is often used 
as the first step in the overall process of labour dispute resolution. It is often if 
conciliation fails to resolve the dispute or if it is a dispute that does not have to be first 
referred to conciliation such as application for interdicts and other matters brought on 
notice of motion that the parties to the labour dispute may resort to other labour 
dispute resolution processes such as strike/lockout, arbitration or court adjudication.  
 
In both labour dispute resolution systems, the Department of Labour is an overseer 
and regulator of the overall labour dispute resolution system and plays an active role 
in the prevention and conciliation of labour disputes, before the disputes are reported 
to the Commission, bargaining council, statutory council or accredited private agency, 
through labour inspections.  In both labour dispute resolution systems, there is an 
established Commission 434 headed by a tripartite governing body 435 and an 
executive director 436 whose main functions include conciliation and arbitration of 
labour disputes. 437 In South Africa there is the Labour Court 438 and the Labour Court 
of Appeal 439 which are specialist labour courts while in Swaziland there is the 
Industrial Court 440 and the Industrial Court of Appeal 441 which are specialist labour 
courts. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.0. Introduction 
The labour dispute resolution systems of South Africa and Swaziland depict both 
marked similarities and marked differences. The South African jurisprudence is older 
than the Swaziland Labour Law and is moreover of a higher standard and complexity 
than the Swaziland labour law. Hence, Swaziland can learn a number of lessons from 
the South African jurisprudence in order to improve the Swaziland labour law.  
Although the labour dispute resolution system of Swaziland is still young and 
undergoing transformation, there are a few lessons that South Africa can learn from 
the Swaziland jurisprudence in order to improve the South African Labour Law. 
 
5.1. Conciliation Lessons for Swaziland. 
 
5.1.1. Right of a Referring Party to apply for Condonation 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland needs to have a legislative provision in the Industrial 
Relations Act442 that gives a referring party the right to apply for condonation for late 
referral of a dispute to the Commission. The current position in Swaziland is that a 
dispute may not be reported to the Commission if more than 18 months have elapsed 
since the issue giving rise to the dispute first arose. 443 Hence, application for 
condonation for late referral of a dispute is expressly excluded. The absence of a the 
right for a referring party in Swaziland to apply for condonation for late referral of a 
dispute means that quite a number of disputes may become stale before they are 
channelled into the dispute resolution system. 
 
In South Africa, a signed application for condonation for late referral of a dispute to 
conciliation, arbitration or court adjudication must be accompanied by the signed 
referral form where condonation is required.444  
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5.1.2. The Use of a Legislated Conciliation-Arbitration Process  
 
Like South Africa, like Swaziland should consider legislating a conciliation-
arbitration process which involves conciliation and arbitration taking place as a 
continuous process, with immediate arbitration on the same day upon the failure of 
conciliation to resolve the dispute and also upon the issuance of a certificate of non-
resolution.  The use of the conciliation-arbitration process ensures that disputes are 
resolved as quickly as possible. 
 
In South Africa, the conciliation-arbitration process is compulsory in all dismissal and 
unfair labour practice disputes involving probationary employees and no party may 
object to a continuous conciliation-arbitration process on the same day.445 On the 
other hand, conciliation-arbitration is voluntary in all dismissal and unfair labour 
practice disputes not involving probationary employees and any party may object to 
the same-day continuous conciliation-arbitration process so that the dispute is referred 
to arbitration at a later date by delivering a written objection to the Commission and 
the other party at least 7 days prior to the date of the conciliation-arbitration.446  
 
5.2. Arbitration Lessons for Swaziland 
 
5.2.1. Making Arbitration Proceedings a Public Hearing like Court Adjudication 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider making arbitration hearings public 
hearings. Although the Labour relations Act447 is silent on whether arbitration 
proceedings are public hearings, section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 448 provides that arbitration by the Commission is a public hearing since 
the Commission is a public body that is subject to the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 449 which provides that everyone has a constitutional right to have his 
                                                 
445 s191(5A) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
446 CCMA rule 17(2). 
447 66 of 1995. 
448 108 of 1996. 
449 108 of 1996. 
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dispute resolved by the application of the law decided in a fair public hearing before a 
court or other independent and impartial tribunal or forum. 
In terms of section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 450 the 
arbitrating commissioner does not have the power to exclude a person from the 
arbitration hearing, unless such exclusion is reasonable and justified. 
 
The present position in Swaziland is that arbitration is a private and confidential 
process and the arbitrating commissioner must not disclose to any person or in any 
court any information, knowledge or document acquired in the course of performing 
his arbitral functions except on an order of any Court. 451 The privacy and 
confidentiality of the arbitration process in Swaziland is likely to undermine the 
quality of the arbitration awards as there is no public monitoring and control 
mechanism. Thus, commissioners may be tempted to act irregularly and fraudulently 
during arbitration proceedings.  
 
5.2.2. Influence of Parties on the Appointment of Arbitrating Commissioners 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should give parties to a dispute some degree of 
influence on the appointment of arbitrating commissioners. This can make the 
arbitrator acceptable to the parties so that his arbitration award is easily acceptable. 
The present position in Swaziland is that parties to a dispute do not have influence on 
the appointment of the arbitrating commissioner to arbitrate their dispute. Section 
81(6) of the Industrial Relations Act 452 provides that notwithstanding the issue of a 
certificate that the dispute is not resolved, the commissioner appointed to conciliate 
the dispute retains jurisdiction over the dispute until it is settled. This means that 
parties to a dispute cannot object to the appointment of the same conciliating 
commissioner as an arbitrating commissioner. 
 
In South Africa, either party to the dispute may object to the same conciliating 
commissioner being appointed the arbitrating commissioner.453  When the 
Commission receives an objection it must appoint another commissioner to arbitrate 
                                                 
450 108 of 1996. 
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the dispute. In South Africa any party to the dispute may apply to the director of the 
Commission to appoint a senior commissioner to arbitrate the dispute. After 
considering the submissions of the parties and the conciliating commissioner, the 
nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute, the complexity of the dispute, the 
public interest and the existence/ non-existence of conflicting arbitration awards in 
similar disputes that may need to be corrected, the director of the Commission may 
grant the application by appointing a senior commissioner to arbitrate the dispute or 
may reject the application by confirming the appointment of the commissioner 
initially appointed. 454  
 
5.2.3. Court Arbitration 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider making a legislative provision that 
grants the Industrial Court arbitral jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes referred to it rather 
than to adjudicate them. Arbitration has advantages over adjudication which include 
informality, higher speed, flexibility and fewer technicalities. The present position is 
Swaziland is that the Industrial Court has no arbitral jurisdiction to sit and hear a 
dispute as an arbitration court. 
In South Africa, Labour Court may acquire jurisdiction to arbitrate rather than 
adjudicate a dispute with the consent of the Labour Court and the parties to an 
arbitration agreement. 455 The Labour Court sits as an arbitration court and not as a 
court of law and only makes an order corresponding to the arbitration award that an 
arbitrator could have made.  
 
5.2.4. Reversion from Arbitration to Conciliation 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider legislating provisions that will 
empower the arbitrating commissioner, with the consent of the parties to suspend the 
arbitration proceedings and attempt to resolve the dispute by reverting to the 
conciliation process so that the final decision is a mutual settlement of both parties. 456  
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5.2.5. Pre-Dismissal Arbitration 
 
Like South Africa, South Africa, Swaziland should consider making legislative 
provisions that will allow an employer with the written consent of the employee to 
request the Commission, a council or a private agency to conduct a pre-dismissal 
arbitration, which takes the place of a disciplinary hearing and which establishes 
whether an employee’s conduct or capacity justifies disciplinary penalties which may 
include dismissal or other penalties short of dismissal. 457 A defective pre-dismissal 
arbitration award is not subsequently subjected to conciliation and arbitration but to 
review by the Labour Court in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act458 
This serves time and money. 
 
5.3. Adjudication Lessons for Swaziland 
 
5.3.1. Court Adjudication by Judges only 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider amending the Industrial Relations 
Act459  so that the Industrial Court is constituted before judges only 460 and not before 
judges and assessors because, in most cases, assessors are people who are not lawyers 
by profession but are just people who posses special skills and knowledge in industrial 
relations matters. Hence, their contribution is most likely to dilute the quality of the 
decision, judgement or order of the Industrial Court. The current position in 
Swaziland is that the Industrial Court is constituted before a judge and two assessors 
who represent capital and labour. 461 However, a judge alone may hear and decide on 
a dispute before the Labour Court if the parties to the dispute so agree. 462  
 
5.3.2. Change Industrial to Labour 
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Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider changing the restrictive adjective” 
industrial” to the more comprehensive adjective “labour” so that an industrial dispute 
is called a labour dispute, so that the Industrial Relations Act 463 is called the Labour 
Relations Act, 464  so that the Industrial Court is called the Labour Court and so that 
the Industrial Court of Appeal is called the Labour Court of Appeal. The adjective, 
“labour” has a broader focus than the adjective, “industrial”.  South Africa re-named 
the Industrial Court the Labour Court as a result of the implementation of the 
Wiehahn Commission in 1979.  
 
5.3.3. Establishment of a Constitutional Court 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider establishing a Constitutional Court that 
will have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine finally all constitutional 
questions of law. The current position in Swaziland is that there is no Constitutional 
Court.  Section 151(2) (b) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland465 gives 
the High Court jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter of a constitutional 
character. Appeals on judgements, decrees or orders of the High Court including 
appeals on constitutional questions of law lie with the Supreme Court which has 
appellate jurisdiction 466 and which is the final court of appeal. In South Africa, any 
constitutional question of law which includes the interpretation, protection or 
enforcement of the Constitution is heard and finally determined by the Constitutional 
Court which is the highest court in all constitutional matters. 467 An appeal from the 
Labour Court or from the Labour Appeal Court on a constitutional matter goes to the 
Constitutional Court. 468  
 
5.4. Strike/ Lockout Lessons for Swaziland 
 
5.4.1. Protection of Protected Strikes/Lockouts from Interdicts  
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Like South Africa Swaziland should consider giving full and real protection to 
protected strikes, protest action and lockouts so that they cannot be interdicted by the 
Court under any circumstance if proof is available that there is compliance with 
section 67(6) of the Industrial Relations Act 469 In South Africa, a protected strike is 
never interdicted but only terminates either when the strikers’ demand has been 
resolved by the employer or when the strikers return to work unconditionally. 470  The 
current position in Swaziland is that the Industrial Court upon an application for an 
interdict by the Minister for Enterprise and Employment may interdict a protected 
actual or threatened strike, protest action or lockout if national interest is threatened 
471  
 
The parties are bound by the court order and must immediately discontinue such 
strike/ lockout and the interest dispute giving rise to the strike/ lockout is deemed to 
have been referred to the Industrial Court by the parties concerned for adjudication. 
472  The interdict of protected strikes, protest action and lockouts undermines the right 
to strike which is a pivotal weapon in collective bargaining. 
 
5.4.2. Legalisation of Secondary Strikes and Secondary Picketing 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider legalising sympathy/ secondary strikes 
in order to promote the bargaining power of weaker trade unions.473 The current 
position in Swaziland is that sympathy/ secondary strikes and hence secondary 
picketing are illegal because the statutory definition of a strike does not include a 
secondary employer. 474 Sympathy strikes and sympathy picketing promote the right 
to strike which is complementary to collective bargaining. Without a fully fledged 
right to strike, the bargaining power of trade unions cannot equate that of the 
employer and this results in disequilibrium in collective bargaining. For effective 
collective bargaining, the trade unions(s) and the employer/ employers’ association 
must be equally strong. 
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5.4.3.  Removal of a Requirement for a Strike / Lockout Ballot   
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should eliminate from its labour legislation the 
requirement for a strike/ lockout ballot in order to determine whether the majority of 
the employees or the employers’ association members are in favour of the strike/ 
lockout. The majority vote is irrelevant because by definition a strike/lockout can be 
undertaken by two or more employees or by one employer. The requirement for a 
majority approval undermines the right to strike/lockout.  
 
The current position in Swaziland is that the Commission is required to arrange and 
supervise a secrete ballot within 7 days of receiving the initial strike/lockout notice to 
determine whether the majority of employees/ members of an employers’ association 
are in favour of the strike/lockout. In the event of a tie in votes, the majority is 
deemed to have not been achieved and the proposed strike/ lockout is invalid and 
illegal. 475 In South Africa, a strike/ lockout ballot is not required even if it is 
prescribed by the union’s constitution or the employers’ association constitution. 476  
 
5.5. General Lessons for Swaziland  
 
5.5.1. Rigorous Commissioner Recruitment, Selection and Training Process 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider embarking on a rigorous two-tier 
commissioner recruitment, selection and training programme in order to raise the 
standard of service that the Commission provides. In terms of this  rigorous two-tier 
commissioner recruitment and training system, prospective commissioners are 
required to undergo a rigorous recruitment-selection and training  programme and are 
only appointed as commissioners once they have demonstrated competence in all the 
core training modules which are Conciliation I module, Conciliation II module, 
Arbitration Module I, Arbitration Module II, Managing dismissal disputes and 
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Substantive Law. 477  Like the Commission in South Africa, the Commission in 
Swaziland must establish an Education, Training and Development Department that 
will be charged with the responsibility to develop its staff and educate the public on 
dispute resolution and labour relations best practice. 478  
 
5.5.2. Combination of General and Specific Labour Dispute Resolution 
Procedures 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider adopting a labour dispute resolution 
system that combines general dispute resolution mechanisms that are characterised by 
central institutions and standard procedures with specific dispute resolution 
mechanisms that are characterised by flexible and specific processes and decentralised 
and specific institutions such as councils and private agencies. To achieve the goal of 
establishing a specific, flexible, decentralised dispute resolution mechanism, 
Swaziland needs to promote the establishment of joint Negotiation Councils.479  At 
present the labour dispute resolution system of Swaziland is strictly of a general 
nature. 
 
5.5.3. Multi-Branch Dispute Resolution Institutions 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland needs to establish an improved network of its labour 
dispute resolution institutions. In Swaziland the Commission has only six branches 
while the Commission in South Africa has 11 branches. In Swaziland the seat of the 
Industrial Court, The industrial Court of Appeal and the High Court is only in 
Mbabane, the capital city of Swaziland. In South Africa, the Labour Court and the 
Labour Court of Appeal has a seat in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port 
Elizabeth.  
 
5.5.4. Accreditation of the Joint Negotiation Councils by the Commission  
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Like South Africa, Swaziland needs to make a legislative provision that Joint 
Industrial Councils that want to perform the statutory conciliation and arbitration 
functions of the Commission must apply for accreditation to the governing body of 
the Commission and be granted such accreditation before they can have jurisdiction to 
perform such functions of the Commission. The current position in Swaziland is that 
Joint Negotiation Councils are not required by law to apply for accreditation. The 
accreditation of councils and private agencies is advantageous in that the Commission 
can accredit only those institutions that meet its standards of competence, that have 
acceptable code of conduct/ ethics and disciplinary procedures and that are 
independent. The Commission can equally discredit them at any time when they fail 
to meet the Commission’s standard of competence and behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, an accredited council or private agency may apply to the governing 
body of the Commission for a subsidy so that it can render free conciliation and 
arbitration services to the public and only charge a reasonable fee where appropriate 
in accordance with the tariff of fees determined by the Commission. 480  
 
5.5.5. Installation of a Call Centre 
 
Like South Africa, Swaziland should consider installing a call-centre that will provide 
all the customer services required by the public for 24 hour a day. The call centre 
should provide a national, multi-lingual, labour-legal and other Commission 
information service to the public such as case queries regarding case numbers, case 
date, case venues and case time. 
 
5.5.6. Acquisition of Residual Jurisdiction by the Commission. 
 
The Commission in Swaziland should  have residual jurisdiction like that of the 
Commission of South Africa so that disputes are mainly resolved by labour dispute 
resolution institutions formed by the parties themselves rather than by the central 
dispute resolution bodies formed by the State such as the Commission, he Industrial 
Court, the Industrial Court of Appeal and the High Court. This means that Swaziland 
                                                 
480 ss127(1), 128 and 132 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
 106
needs to establish specific labour dispute resolution bodies and specific tailor-made 
procedures.  
 
 
5.6. Lessons for South Africa 
 
5.6.1. Intervention by the Commissioner of Labour in Conciliation  
 
Like Swaziland, 481 South Africa should  have a similar provision whereby the 
Commissioner of Labour may intervene in statutory conciliation and conciliate an 
existing dispute or prevent a looming dispute before it is reported to the Commission 
if he is satisfied that the dispute may  adversely affect employers, employees or the 
economy if not prevented or resolved quickly. 
 
5.6.2. Re-direction of some Disputes to Arbitration by the Labour Court 
 
Like Swaziland, 482  South Africa should consider granting jurisdiction to the Labour 
Court to re-direct some of the disputes it has correctly received to arbitration under 
the auspices of the Commission, without the consent of the parties to the dispute. This 
can result in dispute arbitrage until the caseload of the Labour Court is equalised with 
that of the Commission so that there is an equitable distribution of workload and the 
erosion of case backload at the Labour Court. The present position in South Africa is 
that the Labour Court, on receipt of a dispute either adjudicates it as a court of law 
and equity or arbitrates it as an arbitration court with the consent of the parties to an 
arbitration agreement and the Labour Court. 483  
 
5.6.3. Reporting Labour Disputes Direct to the Head of State 
 
Like Swaziland, South Africa can emulate Swaziland’s method of reporting labour 
disputes directly to the Head of State/ the President for determination. This cultural 
method of reporting labour disputes direct to the Head of State is exclusive to the 
                                                 
481 s82 of the IRA of 2005. 
482 s8(8) of the IRA of 2005. 
483 ss141 (5) (a) (ii) and 158(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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Kingdom of Swaziland and is particularly suitable for both disputes of right and 
disputes of interest that are highly sensitive or that threaten national interest. It also 
gives the Head of State, the privilege to getting first hand information about the 
dispute.  
 
5.6.4. Plural Representation of Parties at Conciliation and Arbitration 
Proceedings 
 
Like Swaziland, South Africa may amend its Labour Relations Act484  so that parties 
at conciliation and arbitration proceedings could be represented by more than one 
person. The current position in South Africa is that a party may be represented by one 
person at conciliation/ arbitration. In Swaziland a party may be represented by more 
than one in conciliation 485 and arbitration.486 Thus, a party may represent himself or 
be represented by a legal practitioner (only at arbitration), co-employee(s), a 
member(s), an official(s), an office-bearer(s) and an employee(s) or a director(s) if the 
party is a juristic person or by any other person authorised by such party.  
 
5.6.5. Representation of Parties by Consultants at Arbitration and 
Adjudication.  
 
Like Swaziland, South Africa should consider amending its Labour Relations Act487  
so that consultants can represent parties at arbitration and adjudication proceedings. 
The current position in South Africa is that consultants are excluded from the list of 
persons that may represent a party. This list of persons, which excludes consultants, 
includes a legal practitioner, a designated agent of a council, an official of the 
Department of Labour, a member, an office-bearer, an official of the party’s registered 
organisation and if the party is a juristic person by a director or an employee of that 
juristic party. 488  
 
                                                 
484 66 of 1995. 
485 s81 (4) of the IRA of 2005. 
486 s17(4) of the IRA of 2005. 
487 66 of 1995. 
488 ss161 and 178 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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In Swaziland consultants are included under “any other person authorised by such 
party”   489 and there is also no relevant section in the Industrial Relations Act 490 that 
explicitly excludes consultants from representing a party at conciliation and 
adjudication. While responding to a questionnaire, the current Executive Director of 
the Commission in Swaziland, Mr Siphephiso Dlamini, confirmed that consultants do 
represent parties at arbitration proceedings. He emphasised that since arbitration and 
adjudication are more legal processes than conciliation, it has become accepted 
practice to use outside representatives like consultants and lawyers.   
 
                                                 
489 ss10 and 17(4) of the IRA of 2005. 
490 Of 2005. 
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